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ABSTRACT 
Cooperatives in rural Nepal originated in recent years, after 
the enactment of the Cooperative Society Act 1959, to enable the member 
farmers to have access to credit, goods and inputs to improve their pro-
ductive capacity and level - of living. 
These cooperatives have been operating under different names 
such as Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society, Supervised Multipurpose 
Cooperative Society and Sajha Society . Sajha is the Nepalese word for 
cooperative , and lS used in this study to denote those cooperatives 
introduced since May , 1976 under the Sajha Program, In 30 selected 
district s of the country as a part of the Rural Development Program to 
provide access to credit , agricultural input supply, marketing outlay and 
banking facility in rural areas. 
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the performance 
of the Sajha Program ; a number of indicators have been devised and have 
been statistically tested according to the hypotheses proposed for the 
study . Non-parametric (sign test and chi - square test) and parametric 
(paired t-test and analysis of variance) techniques have been used to 
analyse the performance of the Sajha. 
The results suggest that the introduction of the Sajha Program 
has improved the credit function of the Sajha Society by reducing area 
coverage and providing better services to their member farmers , and has 
also increased the membership, share capital and current lendings. Sajhas 
located in the Plains differ in their efficiency with those of the Hills 
Vll 
ln area coverage, share capital and lendings due to large infrastructure. 
But the Sajhas In the Hills are as efficient as those of the Plains ln 
conducting all their business operations. The larger farmers have 
benefited more from the Sajha credit, their representation in the Advisory 
Committee is greater and default rates among them are higher than those 
of small farmers. 
Sajhas are appropriate tools for rural credit as an institution 
but a larger share of the benefits has gone to the larger farmers. If 
the small farmers are to benefit from Sajha credit, a larger percentage 
of agricultural lending should be allocated to these groups. Representation 
from these groups should be included in the decision making body. 
The terms and conditions of present lending procedures should 
be suitably modified. Loan collection in kind marketing through the 
Sajha with storage facilities, making Sajha free from Panchayat politics, 
higher interest rates for rural savlngs with banking facilities, continuous 
education to members and higher incentives to the staff seem to be 
necessary to make the Sajhas more useful. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND THE PROBLEMS 
1 . 1 The Aim of the Study 
The main aim of this study is to determine the performance of 
Sajha (Cooperative) societiesl under the Sajha Program which was intro-
duced on May 6, 1976 in 30 selected districts under the management of the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADB/N). The study is based on a 
comparison of two periods, 1975 being the base year (before the program) 
and an average of the two years 1976 and 1977 (after the program). 
The study also examines in retrospect the performance of the co-
operative movement In Nepal. Measuring rods for evaluating the per-
formance of the Sajha Societies are developed to test the proposed 
hypotheses regarding the efficiency of the cooperatives. 
1.2 The Problems 
This study particularly seeks to assess the performance of the 
Sajha Program which has been in operation since 1976. This study tries 
to identify the performance constraints in various activities along with 
the credit function of cooperative societies and the management aspects 
which determine their economic viability and efficiency. 
Activity comparisons are made among the Sajhas in different 
regions (Hills/Plains) and their potential for performing various credit 
functions and the reasons for activity variation In different lines of 
business are examined . 
1 Sajha is the Nepalese word for cooperative . However, in this study , 
Sajha is used to denote those cooperative s set up under the Sajha Pr ogram, 
whereas the word ' cooperative ' refers to cooperatives already exi s ting 
at that time. 
2 
This study may provide a benchmark, against which measures of 
change can be undertaken in future. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
The maln hypotheses that are examined in this study are: 
a. the introduction of the supervised Sajha Program 
has improved the functions of the Sajha 
Societies; 
b. improved functioning has led to a greater use of 
credit, profitability and financial turnover of 
the societies; 
c. Sajhas in different regions (Hills/Plains) with 
different lines of activities differ In their 
efficiency due to: 
(1) an uneven rate of growth; and 
(2) large and uneconomic infrastructure. 
d. the dominance of larger (wealthier) and influential 
members in the advisory committee has Lenefitted them 
more than the average members; and 
e. default rates are higher among these dominant 
groups than the average farmers within the 
committee. 
1.4 Measuring Efficiency 
The efficiency measures developed in this study of Sajha Societies 
refer to the strategies of the program in financing the combination of 
imput factors and service facilities to the farmers, to yield returns 
which cover the costs and also minimise t hem. The effic i ency measures 
suggested by the FAO (1974) are defined as the operational decisions tha t 
3 
are optimal for the cooperative activities, but these decisions are only 
to be made if there exists a clear system of targets or aims . The 
efficiency of an organization system can be defined as the extent to which 
its target has been attained (Dulfer 1974). 
The objectives of the Sajha Program are to provide benefits to 
the medium and small farmers with credit services, input supplies and 
marketing facilities and to create capital through savings and share capital 
to finance the agricultural sector through the cooperatives. 
The efficiency of the Sajhas is judged principally by their 
servlces to the member farmers. In order to measure the performance of 
the Sajha Program the following indicators have been proposed as efficiency 
indicators: membership, area and household coverage, share capital, loan 
outstanding, overdues, financial turnover , and profit and loss. 
1.4.1 Membership 
In the present situation of Nepal , the economic efficiency of the 
cooperative organization depends upon the scale of operation. The scale 
of operation determines the economic viability and the efficiency of 
business operations. The scale of operation is a function of the number 
of member clients, and the type and quality of services provided by the 
society. An lncrease in the number of members causes an increase in share 
capital which lS an indicator of the active participation of the farmers 
In the program . This greater share capital allows an increase in business 
activity, resulting In an increase in the income of the society through the 
higher volume of business. Membership varies with the type of society, 
the area coverage and the range of business activities undertaken by the 
society, and also according to the policy within the legal framework of 
membership eligibility. The Cooperative Act (1959) restricts those farmers 
4 
from being members who own more than 10 Bighas l (6.7 ha) of. land. Non 
farmers are ineligible . An increase in membership can also take place 
with the amalgamation of existing non-viable cooperatives into viable 
units . At least one member from each household is expected to join the 
Sajha if the Sajha services are to be provided to the entire farm 
population. An increase in membership is also expected with an increase 
In household coverage in the farm population . Therefore membership can 
be considered one of the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
growth of the society . 
1 . 4.2 Area and Househol£ ~overage 
Area coverage is influenced by the type of society (single/multi-
purpose) and the existing policy of a country. All the Sajhas are multi-
purpose in function and cover a large area depending upon the distance to 
the headquarters . However, government policy is to cover not more than 
2 
two Panchayats under one society. If the society covers a larger area 
of operation, membership may be increased but the quality of serVlces pro-
vided by the society tends to be poor and Vlce versa. 
In the Sajha Program, emphasis has been placed on benefitting 
small and medium farmers; physical coverage of area (Panchayats) has no 
significance if the Sajha is not active in providing new loans and other 
services to the member farmers. The most effective coverage is to render 
its services to all the households. One feature of the Sajha Program is 
that all individuals who contributed to the compulsory savings during the 
land reform program (1963-1966) have been enrolled as members without any 
restriction on the size of their holding . In spite of this, the services 
of the Sajhas may not have reached more than a limited number of households. 
1 1 Bigha = 0 . 67 hectares. This restriction did not apply to those who 
contributed to compulsory savings during the land reform program of 
1963-66. 
2 A Panchayat is a local administrative unit which covers 9 wards, which 
is approximately 5-9 villages. 
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Therefore a reduction in the area of ope ration and an lncrease In household 
1 
coverage have been selected among t he crite ria for asse ssing the p erformanc e 
of the Sajha Program in this study. 
1 . 4 . 3 Share Capital 
Principally share capital lS the maln source of finance to the 
cooperatives . The Cooperative Ac t provides that no member can hold more 
than 1/ 5 of the total share capita l except the government. The government 
can relax these ceilings depending upon the financial situation of the 
2 
society . The value of one share is Rs 50 . 00 payable in five instalments. 
In the Sajha Program al l the compulsory savings collec t ed during the land 
reform program have been transferr ed into the share capital of the societies 
concerned . 3 A drast i c i ncrease in share capital lS expected. Three 
principle means of increasing share capital have been adopted in Nepalese 
cooperatives : 
a . government contribution to share cap ital; 
b. linkin g share holding to borrowing; and 
c. encouraging the collection of share cap ita l 
from members throug h motivation . 
Except for a subsidy in the salarie s of the cooperative managers, the 
Government of Nepal has not contributed to the shar e capital of a gricultural 
societies . 
Borrowing s are linke d with the purc hase of shares . Farmer s 
seeking credit service s thro ugh the cooperative s must purc h a s e a t l e a st one 
s hare of Rs 50 . 00; they may be g ive n an option to pay I n five instalments . 
The contributors to the comp ulsory savings n e ed no t b uy a new shar e if the 
1 The Sajha Program aims to cover all the households under the Sajha in 
its area of operation . In the pre - Sajha situation the Cooperative 
Soc i e ty ha d t o cover many Panchaya t s . The strategy adopted under the 
n e w Program i s to cover less area with more households , so as to provide 
bet t e r ser v i ces t o the member farmer s . This i s to be achieved by a 
r educ tion in the area cover age and an increase in the household coverage . 
2 Cooper a tive Socie t y Ac t 1959 . 
US$l = NRs 1 2 . 5 . Th r o ughout t his thes i s Rs r efers t o Nepa l ese Rupees. 
3 The total amo unt o f compul sory savi ngs so fa r co l lected throughout the 
country during the l and r e f o r m program was approximately Rs 80 million . 
6 
value of the ir c ontribution e xceed s Rs 50 . 00 , othe rwi se a member has 
1 
to pay the difference . 
1 . 4.4 Loan Outstanding 
The volume of loan outstanding indicates the efficiency of the 
credit function of the society . The Sajha usually extends short term 
(6-18 month) loans for the production of cereal grains and cash crops (rice, 
wheat, maize and jute , sugar cane, tobacco , oilseed, cardamon and ginger), 
and medium term loans maturing at 2-3 years (for live stock, bullocks, 
sprayers , small implements, construction of barns and retting ponds) . 
The demand for short term credit depends upon the stage of 
agricultural development and the types of crop grown in the area of 
operation . If the farmers are producing at subsistence level along 
traditional lines, the requirement for loan is expected to be less than In 
areas where farmers are making use of improved methods of cultivation ; 
this is reflected in a h i gher rate of loan outstanding (M.S. 1970) . The 
limiting factor on the supply side lS the rate of interest charged, the 
availability of inputs on time, the source of funds (share capital and 
borrowings ) and government policy towards agriculture. In societies 
where agricultural infrastructure (marketing outlay s, e x ten s ion s e rVlces , 
etc .) is well developed, a higher participation rate is anticipated, and 
consequently a hig her rate of outstanding loans per member . Active par-
ticipation is linked to a higher turnover indicating that the services of 
the society are effective. 
Th e volume of loan also d e p ends upon the terms and condition s o f 
loans . Short term loans ar e generall y advanced agains t standing c r ops 
whil e med i um term l oans a r e g r anted aga i nst tangible securi ty . Most of 
1 Th e r ura l sav ings progr am was compul sory to a l l cul tivators , despite the i r 
size of ho ldi ngs . Al l the farme r s con ribut ing to co mpu l sory savings in 
the Panchayats are me mbe r s inc luding t he o l d members . However , the increa ~ 
in membe r sh i p per Sajha Society was 228 members of a t o tal o f 519 membe r s 
pe r Sajha Soc i e t y . 
3 (Cont ' d ) 
The r eport f rom ADB shows t hat approximately Rs 6 0 million have been 
transferre d i n to the s h a r e c ap i tal of the Sajha Societ i es . The increase 
of share cap ita l pe r s ocie ty i n the sample was found t o be Rs 11 5 ,700 . 
On the ba s i s of t h i s a v e r a g e , t he total share capital amounted to 
Rs 62 , 825 , 1 00 . 
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the medium term loans are not within the reach of the small farmers due to 
restrictions on the amount and type of their security. The credit limits 
per unit area are worked out on the basis of recommended doses of inputs, and 
labour charges according to the requirements of the farmers at the existing 
local price . Credit lS extended both in cash and kind. Labour charges 
and purchase of draft animals are extended in cash while inputs are in 
kind . 
1.4.5 Overdues 
The efficiency of the Sajha can also be measured through non 
repayments on time. When a society's level of overdues are high the 
institution can no longer render effective services, because the members 
are violating the rules of cooperative principles. The overdue position 
has been viewed as the proportion of non repayment (on time) to the total 
loan outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
1.4.6 Financial Turnover 
Besides providing credit to members, financial turnover refers to 
the buying and selling of production factors, consumer goods and the 
marketing of agricultural produce. Lending operations in Nepal are 
seasonal so the Sajha has to conduct other business activities to cover 
its costs while rendering services to the members. Depending upon the 
agricultural infrastructure and storage facilities the financial turnover 
per society can be high or low in a glven year. The financial turnover 
determines the effective demand for the cooperative serVlces . Sajhas 
having a higher financial turnover can earn more income to survive In the 
long run than Sajhas having a lower financial turnover. This again 
depends upon the cropping pattern , input supplies and marketing facilities 
and conditions of infrastructure. 
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1.4 . 7 Profit and Loss 
One of the measures of viability of a Sajha is its net profit 
over the year, although profit making lS not one of the objectives of the 
cooperative principle; its motivation lS towards serVlces to the members. 
If the societies are to surVlve In the long run they must operate at least 
at the break-even point (where expenses equal income). Profit alone does 
not indicate cooperative efficiency. 
None of the above indicators In isolation indicates cooperative 
1 
efficiency but a combination of them should indicate the performance of 
the Sajha Program for evaluation purposes . 
1.5 The Data and its Source 
The analysis in this thesis is conducted with the objective of 
evaluating the performance of the Sajha Program after two years of imple-
2 
mentation. A sample of 30 cooperatives have been selected and stratified, 
11 representing the Hills , 15 from the Plains and 4 Unions performing only 
supply functions in the Plains. The sample covers 58% of the area under 
the Sajha Program and 5 . 5% of the total Sajhas in the 30 selected districts . 
A copy of the survey questionnaire used in this study is attached in 
Appendix 1. 
The stratified sample represents 10 Sajhas from the Eastern reglon, 
11 from the Central and 9 from the Far Western reglon covering 8 zones and 
14 districts, as presented in Table 1 . 1. 
1 . 5.1 Data Source 
Records and documents In the Sajha Societies (as p rescribed by the 
ADB and Cooperative Department), periodic reports, and audit reports 
1 No weightage has been placed on any individual indicator, however, as 
this study i s concerned with credit , priority has been given to the 
distribu ion of credit , and the profit indicator has least preference, 
because the coopera tive principle as such is not motivated towards 
profit making . 
2 Or i ginal ly the survey was planned by the Agricultural Development Bank 
of Nepal . However, the pro ject was abandoned after data collection . 
The present study takes up the original quest ionna ires of the ADB. 
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TABLE 1.1 
SELECTION OF SAMPLES FROM THE DISTRICTS 
UNDER THE SAJHA PROGRAM 
Districts Districts Number Selected Region Zones Under of (Political) 
Sajha Cooper- Zone Districts No of 
atives Coop. 
Eastern 3 16 7 132 3 4 10 
Central 3 19 11 219 3 5 11 
Western 3 23 6 105 
Far Western 5 17 6 87 2 5 9 
Total 14 75 30 543 8 14 30 
Source: Research and Planning Division ADB/N, 1978. 
approved by the registrar were used as well as loan records from the 
district level, ADB branches and sub-branches and records from the district 
level cooperative office. 
A quest ionnaire was developed In the central office of the ADB and 
tested. The final survey was carried out in the field and was conducted 
by the officer level staff of the ADB. 
1.5.2 The Data and its Limitations 
The data under study is not a time serles as it covers only a 
three year period which may not be representative enough to evaluate the 
program . But the sample covers 5.5% of the total Sajhas and covers more 
or less the entire country, so it should give some indication of the 
efficiency measures of the Sajhas' performance. 
1 . 6 Organization of the Study 
This study is presented In eight chapters. The first is a general 
introduction, stating the aim, the main problems, the source and the 
10 
limitations of the data and the efficiency indicators. The second chapter 
deals with the statistical measures of efficiency stating the techniques of 
analysis and their applicability to the hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 deals with cooperative principles and their relevance to 
Nepalese cooperatives followed by operational procedures and the 
organizational structure of the Sajhas . 
Chapter 4 looks at the role of the cooperative system in Nepalese 
agriculture , the aspects of demand and suppl y of credit from institutional 
sources and terms and conditions. 
Chapter 5 expl ains the Sajha efficiency indicators and the details 
of the statistical results . Chapter 6 examines Sajha credit and farm size 
looking at the distribut i on of loan on different sizes of farm holding, 
repayments and overdue aspects. 
Chapter 7 analyses the working of the Sajhas, the oplnlons and 
experiences of borrowing members, non borrowers and the Sajha employees. 
The final chapter contains a summary , concluding remarks and 
recommendations for policy implementation in the light of the findings . 
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CHAPTER 2 
STATISTICAL MEASURES OF EFFICIENCY 
This chapter provides details of the statistical measures adopted 
for studying the performance of the Sajha Program. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main objective of the Sajha Program 
is to increase the availability of credit for improved farming practices 
especially to small and medium farmers. 
2 .1 Techniques of Analysis 
Basically nonparametric techniques have been used to analyse the 
performance of the Sajha Program at the first stage of analysis. This will 
indicate whether or not a change has occurred in the post-Sajha situation 
compared to pre-Sajha. Then the magnitude of change has been determined 
using a parametric technique to compare the means of the Sajha Program with 
pre-Sajha conditions . Differences in the kinds of activity undertaken by 
the Sajhas located in the Hills and those in the Plains have been determined 
by group mean comparison using analysis of variance. 
2.1.1 Nonparametric Tests 
The first two hypotheses (as indicated in Section 1.3) that 'the 
introduction of the Supervised Sajha Program has improved the credit function 
of the Sajha Societies'; and that 'improved functioning has led to greater 
use of credit, profitability and the financial turnover of the Sajha 
Societies', are examined using the sign test. The sign test has been 
chosen for the following two reasons: (i) the study uses ordinal measures 
with two periods of observation (before and after) using plus and mlnus 
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slgns rather than quantitative measures; and (ii) the study wishes to 
establish that these two conditions (before and after) are different 
without making any assumption about the form of distribution in their 
activities (performance). 
2.1.2 The Sign Test 
The observations of performance indicators (as discussed in Section 
1.4) for 26 multipurpose Sajhas and 4 district unions have been taken in-
dependently. The regional variability in their performance is assumed to 
exist due to an uneven rate of growth, large and uneconomlC infrastructure 
and management factors. But again these can be assumed to be normally 
distributed; some Sajhas have a larger volume of transactions, and some are 
poor in all their operations, but when an average of the performance of 
each Sajha is taken, conceptually it has the same effect as standardization 
within a glven period of the year under consideration. 
2.1.3 The Test Procedure (for d e tails s ee Sidne y Siegel 1956, 
p . 68-75) 
then, 
P (~X.) 
l 
T - Bin(n,p) 
n 
P (Z:SXi + .5-2 ) 
~ ~ 
/npq 
a. 
2 
n 
P(Z~ ~ -l + .5-2 ) a. 
= = 
/npq 
n 
~ -l + .5-2 
/npq 
a. 
= 
2 
2 
h = n-£ 
CR is ~~ -l and T:::: h+l 
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where, np = mean 
npq = standard deviation 
q = (l-p) 
P = probability of improvement In the functions (activities) 
where, 
of the Sajha = .5 
= .025 (for two tailed probability ) 
= -1.96 from the binomial distribution table 
T = number of observed + s 
X. = activities of the Sajha 
l 
£ = lower limit of CR 
h = upper limit of CR 
CR = critical region, l.e., region of rejection. 
2 . 1 . 4 The Hypotheses 
Ho; P (XA. >XB . ) = P (XA. <XB . ) = . 5 l l l l 
HI ; P (XA. >XB . ) :I P (XB. <XA. ) l l l l 
XA. = "Activities of the Sajhas after the Program l 
XB. = Activities of the Sajhas before the Program l 
The direction of the difference has been made by noting the slgns (plus or 
minus) and the matched palrs have been dropped from the number of 
observations . 
An increase In the activities of the Sajha has an equal chance of 
occurring as a decrease in their activities to the binomial distribution of 
p= . 5, hence the test lS two tailed (XA.>XB. = .5 and XA.<XB = . 5). 
l l l i 
The extreme values from CR are accepted so the region of rejection 
lS agaln two tailed. 
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2.1.5 Limitation of the Sign Test 
The sign test is the mildest test among the statistical measures, 
since we are asslgnlng only signs (+ or -) to the performance of the Sajha 
despite the existence of a nominal change or a large change. We can not 
be sure of its significance even if the results are positive. 
2 .2 Chi-square Test 
The last two hypotheses (as indicated in Section 1.3) namely that 
' the larger and more influential members of the advisor y c ommittee . 
have been benefitted more than the smaller and medium farmers', and that 
' the default rates are higher among the dominant groups than the smaller 
and medium farmers', are studied using the Chi-square test. 
In the Sajha Program no special election is held for the Advisory 
Committee Board , which is the decision making body for the day to day 
operation of the Sajha. All the members of the local Panchayaty Politics 
are ex-officio members of the Advisory Committee. 
2 . 2 .1 Test Procedures 
The loans outstanding against members of the Advisory Committee 
have been classified as nondelinquent and delinquent (overdue). Members 
of the Advisory Committee have been further categorised into three groups 
according to the size of their holdings as a basis for distinguishing small, 
1 
medium and larger farmers. The category of the holdings is 0-4 Bighas 2 , 
4-10 Bighas and above 10 Bighas , t o define small , med ium and larger farme rs 
respectively. 
1 Throughout the study the size of the holdings has been classifie d a s 
0-2 Bigha 2-4 Bigha 4-10 Bigha and above 10 Bigha but in this a naly sis 
0-2 Bigha and 2-4 Bigha have been combined to 0-4 Bigha and the other two 
are analysed as such to define small, medium and larger farmers. 
2 1 Bigha = .67 hectares 
IS 
The total number of advisory committee members recorded in the 30 
sample societies was 90, out of which 36 are large and the rest are medium 
and small having the size of their farm holdings less than 10 Bighas. 
2.2.2 The Test (Sidney Siegel 1956 ) 
k 2 2 r O .. E .. lJ - lJ) X = L: L: ( E .. i=l j=l lJ 
RxC 
E .. = 
lJ N 
2 2 (r-l) (c-l) CR is X >X 1j (ex) = .05 u = 
where, 0.. = Observed amount of delinquent and nondelinquent loans lJ 
1 'f' d' h .th h .th 1 c aSSl le In tel row of t e J co umn. 
E .. = Expected amount of delinquent and nondelinquent loans lJ 
.th 
of the .th column. In l row J 
r k 
L: L: = Sum of all rows (r) and all columns (k) . 
i=l j=l 
R = Row total. 
C = Column total. 
N = Grand total. 
= Degrees of freedom. 
ex = CI l evel. 
A Chi-square test has been conducted to determine the significant difference 
between the groups of members on default rates who are hence violating the 
cooperative principles. 
Although the measurement involves a weak nominal scaling, the total 
number of independent observations is ninety and is assumed to be normally 
distributed, so this can be a good estimation of the default rate amongst 
the three groups of farm size holdings of the Board members. 
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2 . 3 Simple Parametric Tests 
To overcome the magnitude of change in the performance of the 
Sajhas, two parametric tests, namely paired t-test and the analysis of 
variance , have been used to determine the significance of the activities. 
The data has been arranged pairwise (before and after), and a comparison 
of means has been conducted uSlng the t-test (also known as the correlated 
t-test) for equality and inequality of the means . 
The main interest of this study is to evaluate the difference in 
an activity between the post-Sajha and pre- Sajha situations and to establish 
a statistical significance between two periods . 
2 . 3 . 1 Comparison of the Sample Means (For details see, Nie, Hull, 
Jenkins , Karin and Bent 1975 , pp . 268-70) 
The study wishes to show that the mean of the number of activities 
of the Sajhas after the Program is larger than the pre-Sajha means. The 
group means are the basis of comparison which have been estimated by the 
sample means , so the direction of the test is one tailed. The two tailed 
probability has been divided by two to convert it to one tailed (Nie, Hull 
et al 1975) . 
occurred . 
Hypothesis; 
A negative sign is expected for t-values if an increase has 
Ho; ~l ~2 
HI· 11 > 11 ' ~ l ~2 
where , ~l = mean of number of activities of the Sajhas after the 
program . 
~2 = mean of number of activities of the Sajhas before the 
program. 
where, 
2.3.2 The Test 
Sp 
-
di 
-
td 
Xl 
-
X
2 
-Sd 
n l 
n 2 
2 S 
2 2 2 Sp = (nl-l) Sl + (n 2-l)S2 
- - -di = X -X 1 2 
-
Xl _X 2 
td = ( ) with tn l +n 2 -2 d.f. -Sd 
- I 2 2 2l: x l x 2 Sd = Sl+S2-
n-l / n 
2 1 - 2 S = l: (x. -x) 
n-l l 
- -
Xl _X 2 / Ho -2 t = - tn l +n 2 Sp/l 1 
- + 
n l n 2 
CR is T>tn +n -2 (a) 1 2 
= Pooled estimate of t. 
= Mean difference. 
= t value of the difference. 
= Mean of number of act ivities before the 
= Mean of number of activities after the 
= Standard deviation of the difference. 
= Number of Sajhas before the Program. 
= Number of Sajhas after the Program. 
= Standard deviation. 
2 .4 Analysis of Variance 
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Program. 
Program. 
2 .4.1 Comparison of Sajhas Between the Hills and the Plains 
The third hypothesis proposed in Section 1.3 is that 'the Sajha 
Societies in different regions (Hills/Plains) with different lines of 
activities differ in their efficiency due to: (i) uneven rate of growth; 
and (ii) large and uneconomic infrastructure '. 
18 
An analysis of varlance technique has been conducted for eleven 
societies in the Hi lls and fifteen societies in the Plains . The activities 
~ave been computed by subtracting the performance of the pre-Sajha from the 
post - Sajha situation . 
The gr oup mean of the number of activities is the basis of 
comparlson . The actual testing has been done by computing the F - ratio 
(between- group mean square/within- group mean square). The test is 
particul arly se l ected t o d e t ermine whether o r not the mean of the activities 
of the Sajhas in the Hills d i ffers signi ficantl y from the mean of the 
activities of the Sajhas i n the Plains . 
2 . 4 . 2 The Test 
Y . = ~ + a. + e . l = 1, 2 , ... , 26 lJ J lJ 
J = 1 , 2 
l: . n . ~ . 
= 
J J J nJ = 26 E.n. 
J J 
E.l:.Y . l J l J m = E.n . 
J J 
a. = ~. -~ 
J J 
where , ~ = The grand mean in both the regions . 
a . = The effect of the Sajha Program. 
J 
e . . = A random error . lJ 
~. = Mean of the 
J 
Hills and mean of the Plains. 
m = Sample mean . 
Hypothesis; 
2 2 (l:m l + l:m2) 2 } TSS = l:ml + l:m2 + { n l + n 2 
CSS 
( l:ml ) 2 
+ 
(l:m2) 2 
- { ( l:m l + l: m2) 2 } = 
RSS = 
EMS = 
CMS = 
F = 
n l n 2 
TSS - CSS 
RSS 
d .f. ml +d .f. m2 
CSS 
--
d . f . 
CMS 
EMS 
n l +n 2-l 
ANOVA TABLE (Analysis of Variance Table) 
Source d.f. SS 
Between groups r-l RSS 
Within groups nl-r CSS 
r 
Total l: nl-r 
i= l 
where, ml = Mean of number of activities 
m2 = Mean of number of activities 
TSS = Total sum of squares . 
RSS = Regression sum of squares . 
CSS = Column sum of squares . 
ESS = Error sum of squares . 
CMS = Column mean square. 
d.f . = Degrees of freedom . 
In 
In 
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MS F-ratio 
RSS/r-l 
CSS/ni-r RSS/r-l 
CSS/ni-r 
the Hills. 
the Plains. 
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2.4.3 Interpretation 
If the computed F-value is greater than the tabulated value 
(F-ratio) then the null hypothesis that the two means are equal lS rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis Hl is accepted. 
2.5 Coefficient of Variation 
This study also wishes to compare the variation In the distribution 
of loans, repayments and overdues within the groups (for different Slzes 
of farm holding) as a percentage of the means. This is also known as the 
coefficient of variation which has been computed as: (Croxton & Cowden 
1964, pp . 222-5). 
S V = - x 100 
X 
where, V = Coefficient of variation. 
S = Standard deviation. 
X = Mean . 
This is particularly selected because the standard deviation is not 
directly comparable between the groups (for different sizes of farm holding) . 
The coefficient of variation indicates the size of variation within as well 
as between the groups. The coefficient of variation has been comp ared 
for different groups which differ with respect to mean or standard 
deviation or both. 
We are interested to know whether or not relative distribution 
(of loans, r epayments and overdues) and the size of variation occurs within 
the groups . The amount of loans , repayments and overdues on different 
sizes of farm holding has been taken as a proxy for the active participation 
20 
2.4.3 Interpretation 
If the computed F -value lS greater than the tabulated value 
(F-ratio) then the null hypothesis that the two means are equal lS rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis Hl lS accepted . 
2 . 5 Coefficient of Variation 
This study also wishes to compare the variation In the distribution 
of loans, repayments and overdues within the groups (for different sizes 
of farm holding) as a percentage of the means. This is also known as the 
coefficient of variation which has been computed as : (Croxton & Cowden 
1964, pp . 222-5 ). 
S V = - x 100 
X 
where, V = Coefficient of variation . 
S Standard deviation. 
X = Mean. 
This is particul arly selected because the standard deviation is not 
directly comparable between the groups (for different sizes of farm holding) . 
The coefficient of variation indicates the size of variation within as well 
as between the groups. The coefficient of variation has been compared 
for different groups which differ with respect to mean or standard 
deviation or both . 
We are interested to know whether or not relative distribution 
(of loans , repayments and overdues) and the size of variation occurs within 
the groups . The amount of loans, repayments and overdues on different 
sizes of farm holding has been taken as a proxy for the active participation 
21 
and default rates of member farmers among different Slzes of farm holding 
and are compared by setting up a measure of relative dispersion. 
2 . 6 Summary 
To determine whether or not a change has occurred with the intro-
duction of the Sajhas , the first two hypotheses that ' the introduction of 
the Supervised Sajha Program has improved the credit function of the Sajha 
Societies ' and that ' improved functioning has led to a greater use of credit, 
profitability and the financial turnover ' are tested by using a slgn test. 
Then to determi ne the magnitude of the change and its significance , 
a comparlson of means using a paired t-test has been conducted for the 
analysis . 
For the third hypothesis proposed that ' the Sajha Societies In 
different regions with different lines of activities differ in their 
efficiency ' (i . e ., to determine the regional variability), a group mean 
comparison using an analysis of variance has been conducted. 
To determine the disparity between the small and medium farmers 
and the large farmers in their access to credit and the default rates 
among the larger farmers the fourth and fifth hypotheses that 'the larger 
farmers and the influential members dominate the Advisory Committee to 
their own benefit and the default rates are higher among these dominant 
groups ' are tested by using a Chi-square test. 
The variations within the groups as the percentage of the means 
are tested by comparing the Coefficient of Variation to determine whether 
or not variation occurs within the groups. 
The details of the results of these analyses will be discussed In 
Chapters 5 and 6 . 
22 
CHAPTER 3 
COOPERATIVES IN NEPALESE AGRICULTURE 
In this chapter an attempt is made to examine some aspects of 
cooperative principles, their relevance to Nepalese conditions, and their 
social and economic organisation. 
3 . 1 Cooperative Defined 
There have always been instances in the history of human society, 
as Helm (1968) states , where individuals have corne together to achieve 
certain aims in cooperat i on with others . These cornmon efforts were 
usually directed to fulfilling certain temporary needs. 
The word cooperative , as defined in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, 
lS derived from the Latin word, coparare which simply means working together 
for some cornmon purpose (Holyoake 1875 , p . l) . 
3 . 1 . 1 The Concept of the Cooperative Movement 
The rise and expansion of the modern cooperative has its roots in 
the far-reaching economic , social and political changes which took place 
in Europe In the late 18th century and all through the 19th century, 
especially in the Industrial Revolution and the liberation of the peasantry 
from the feudalistic system (Helm 1968, pp . 1-3). 
In spite of these favourable conditions, the cooperative movement 
would not have grown so fast if it had not been for a group of dedicated, 
philanthropist politicians, churchmen and civil servants who promoted co-
operation by instilling a general enthusiasm for its ideals or by showing 
the way through practical examples, like Mahatma Gandhi in Indian 
cooperatives . 
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In England people like Robert Owen and William King applied the 
methods of cooperation to a consumer movement, the first successful 
venture being the Rochdale Pioneers . This movement subsequently spread 
allover the world. 
3.1 . 2 Definition of Cooperative Principles 
As Helm (1968, p.3) states: 
' .. . the modern cooperative is very difficult to define 
because of wide variation in its functions, the 
flexibility in its organisation, easy adaptability to 
a variety of different purposes and widely diverging 
economic and social systems. Therefore the 
definition of cooperative principles that should 
govern its operation and organisation has been 
difficult to define. ' 
Different people have expressed their Vlews on cooperat ive 
principles on the basis of social and economlC needs as follows: 
a cooperative society is an organisation for the 
purpose of joint trading, originating among the weak 
and conducted always in an unselfish spirit on such 
terms that all who are prepared to assume the duties 
of membership , share in its rewards in proportion to 
the degree in which they make use of their association' 
(Fary 1908 cited in Tyagi1968, p . 4). 
' ... a cooperative is a form of organisation where the 
persons voluntarily associate together as human beings 
on the basis of equality for the promotion of economic 
interest of themselves' (Hubert Calverts 1926 cited in 
Hough 1966, p.4l). 
'Self help made effective by organisation is co-
operation ' (Sir H. Plunkett 1928, cited in Hough 1966, 
p.4l) . 
3.1 . 3 Cooperatives for Agricultural Development 
The agricultural cooperative movement started in Germany in the 
form of credit , supply and marketing as initiated by Raiffeisen in 1849 1 
1 Raiffeisen ' s principles are : (i) open membership; (ii) democratic 
control; (iii) limited interest on shares; (iv) patronage rebates; 
(v) goods be sold at current market price in cash; (vi) neutrality 
of race, religion , etc .; (vii) continuous education to members; and 
(viii) loyalty and honesty in trading . 
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(Digby 1949 , Ch . VI; Abraham 1973 , p . 2). In India the British Colonial 
government introduced the cooperative system in 1904 after intensive study 
of the Rallfeisen and Luzzati credit soc i ety from where it spread allover 
Asia (Abraham 1973, p . 2). The definition used in this study is that of 
the FAO (Duler 1974, p . S) : 
' Cooperatives of agricultural producers or workers which 
serve agricultural production and marketing in the rural 
areas and are registered as cooperative societies in the 
l egal sense ' 
3 . 2 Ideology of the Cooperative Movement 
In spite of these controversies as to the definition of cooperative 
principles , the concept of cooperation can be c l assified into three main 
schools of thought (He lm 1 968 , pp . 3-S). 
3 . 2 .1 The Cooperative Enterprise School 
This is also called the pacemakers or cooperative yardstick 
school: it is based on a voluntary association of independent units. 
The primary objective of the cooperative soc i ety is the advancement of the 
members ' economic interests, and the protection and maintenance of the 
economlc independence of the small entrepreneurs and farmers by balancing 
economlc weakness through the pooling of resources and thus achieving 
economies of scale . 
It is apparent that cooperatives are out to improve their 
individual economic position ln a competitive situation. 
3 . 2 . 2 The Cooperative Commonwealth School 
In addition to what we have discussed in Section 3 . 2 . 1 the long 
term objective of cooperatives is to eliminate the competitive capitalistic 
system and replace it by an economic system based on mutual cooperation: 
thus this thought leads towards socialism . 
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3.2.3 The Socialist Cooperative School 
This is the most recent school of thought based on Marxist-
Leninist theory, according to which cooperation can be an important step 
in socialist progress. In this school , a cooperative 1S defined as an 
economic and socia l organization of the working people, serving not only 
the interest of the members, but also of social progress, which promotes, 
safeguards and realises the interests and aspirations of the working 
people . 
As cooperatives desperately struggle to promote their respective 
schools of thought only a few like Prof. W. Preus and Bernhard Lavergue 
have subscribed to more liberal views that cooperatives include 'free 
cooperatives which determine their own economic policy as well as state 
operated cooperatives with fixed economic targets under overall government 
planning ' (Helm 1968, pp.3-5). 
3.3 Agricultural Cooperatives 1n the Nepalese Economy 
Nepalese agriculture is predominantly a traditional subsistence 
sector consisting of small and fragmented holdings with a low level of 
productivity . This sector contributes 65.03% to GOP, provides employment 
for 94.4% of the people and is the main source of foreign exchange (HMG. 
Agricultural Statistics of Nepal 1977 ). 
3 . 3.1 Credit System 
The main source of credit to rural people is still non-institutional 
sources , such as relatives, landlords and private moneylenders, etc . with 
the exception of relatives, these creditors are like parasites and exploit 
the people with exorbitantly high rates of interest along with discounts 
d 'f 1 an gl ts . 
1 It is believed that rural people in Nepal are 
are born , brought up and die in debt and then 
their future generations. 
heavily in debt. The y 
transfer these debts to 
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The majority of farmers are illiterate and ignorant, no documents 
of the exact amounts transacted are kept, land is offered as a collateral 
against loans and would eventually fall into the hands of the creditors. 
The annual interest is added to the principle amount and is thus ac-
cumulated, which compels the borrowers to dispose of their land to the 
lenders . 
The formal lending institutions are of very recent orlgln In 
Nepal , emerging as a result of the land reform program in 1963. They 
include the Agricultural Development Bank and the primary agricultural 
cooperative societies of today. 
It is believed that the majority of small and medium farmers have 
not benefitted from the existence of these formal institutions because 
tangible assets are required as a security for loan which small farmers 
cannot offer . Moreover credit from formal sources involves delay and 
the completion of many formalities which is a difficult task for illiterate 
small farmers (FAO 1966 , pp . 1-15). 
3 . 3.2 History of Cooperation In Nepalese Agriculture 
Cooperation in the form of mutual help has a long history in the 
rural community since time immemorial . The system of group farming is 
1 known as Manka-Jya and Parma - a system of exchange of labour and pooling 
of farm resources to work together (Sinha 1964, p.3; Prabasi 1966, p.37). 
A religious grain store for the mobilisation of deposits in the Hills is 
known as Dharam Bhakari (Grainbank). A donation of grain is made vol-
untarily according to the capacity of the members . The objective of the 
grainbank is probably for famine relief or welfare in the time of natural 
calamities. 
1 The exchange of labour and farm resources in KathmanduValley among some 
of the farming ethnic community is known as Manka-Jya while a similar 
system in the Hills is known as Parma . 
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A traditional system of cooperation known as Dhikuri (a cash bank) 
In some of the north-west districts is formed by a group of people within 
the community for business purposes . Each member contributes a certain 
amount of money to a common fund, the members borrow from the fund when 
they need to for business with an interest of 10-15% per annum. The main 
organizer enJoys the facility of 3-5 % commission from the interest earned 
by the Dhikuri (Sinha 1964, pp.1-3) . 
3 . 3 . 3 The Modern Cooperative Movement in Nepal 
The cooperative along modern lines started in 1953 (Prabasi 1966, 
p . 41) when flood affected and landless people were resettled in the Rapti 
1 Valley to reclaim the large forest area for cultivation. A decision to 
organize cooperative societies as a matter of state policy was undertaken 
in 1956 (Sinha 1964, Ch.2 , p . 4) after the cooperative department had been 
set up in 1954. 
The importance of cooperatives arose when the settlers had a 
dearth of factor inputs to cultivate the fallow land. Cooperatives wer e 
set up as a government intervention program to provide credit and input 
supplies to the settlers . While introducing the cooperative system in 
-the initial period, the main problems were the absence of cooperative law, 
lack of financial institutions and lack of trained personnel in the co-
operative field. 
A small development fund was created by the Treasury for financing 
the settlers through cooperatives (Prabasi 1966, pp.41-42). The first 
cooperative society of the Raiffeisen model was organized in the Rap ti 
1 Rapti Valley is in the Chitwan district of Nepal a nd has very fertile 
land on the bank of the Narayani river, southwest from Kathmandu . 
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Valley with an executive order issued by HMG In 1956 authorising the 
organization , registration and operational procedures (Sinha 1964, p.5). 
The first Cooperative Society Act was enacted in 1959 (Sinha 
1964, p.5) , the features of the Act being as follows: 
a . At least 10 persons should form a cooperative 
society , the objective being to lmprove the 
d ' , h 1 economlC con ltlons of t e members . 
b . The liability of the society would depend upon 
the nature o f the work it intends to undertake. 
If the society is a primary credit society, the 
liability is unlimited , but if it lS multi-
purpose the liability lS limited . 
c . Members wi l l have one vote irrespective of the 
number of shares purchased . 
d . The society would be exempt from stamp duty, 
registration fees and income tax . 
e . A reserve fund would set aside 25% from the net 
profit. 
f. A society will be liquidated if two-thirds of 
its members apply for it or total members are 
less than 25 or if the society is considered to 
be mismanaged . 
g . There is a provision for arbitration if disputes 
arise between the societies or among themselves. 
h . The government can participate in the share 
capital up to 51 per cent . 
1 Later the Act was amended - a society now requires at least 25 members. 
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J . Debentures can be floated by a society to attract 
capital. 
k . A society should be registered under the 
Cooperative Act; powers regarding promotion, 
organization, supervision, registration and 
settlement of disputes are glven to the Registrar. 
The Act envisages the formation of cooperative societies for the 
promotion of thrift , self-help and mutual aid among persons having limited 
capital and engaged in agriculture. 
3.4 The Cooperative Movement During Four Plan Periods 
3 . 4 . 1 The First Plan 1956-1961 
The first legislation carne into existence in 1959. The highlights 
of its achievement are presented in Table 3.1 below. The achievements are 
TABLE 3.1 
ACTIVITIES OF COOPERATIVES DURING FOUR PLAN PERIODS 
,s . No . Activities 1956-61 1961-62 1962-65 1966-70 Total 1956-70 
1 Total No . of Societies T 450 0 T n.a . T 22 0 0 'T' n. a . T n.a. 
A 378 A 203 A 542 A 36 0 A 1483 
2 Total Membership 11059 4825 13916 27 916 57538 
3 Share Capital (Rs 000) 363 124 1177 838 4101 
4 Loan Advanced (Rs 000) 1957 989 1162 n.a. 4108 
5 Average Member/Society 29 24 26 77 39 
6 Av. Share Capital/ 
Society Rs 24 26 84 30 71 
7 Loan Advanced/Member Rs177 205 84 n.a. 71 
Notes: T = target 
A = actual 
n.a. = not available 
Source: Derived from HMG, inistry of Land Reform, Department of 
Cooperatives, 1971 . 
encouraging In absolute terms but not satisfactory in relative terms. 
The average number of cooperatives, membership, share capital and loan 
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advanced are 378, 29, Rs 24 and Rs 177 respectively. A target was fixed 
to organize 4,500 cooperative societies, but at the end of the plan only 
378 had been organized indicating the overestimation of the target. The 
main deficiency of the first plan was that no financial prOVlSlon was 
made , the target was fixed to depend on foreign aid (HMG. Ministry of 
Planning 1956). 
Intervention Period 1961-1962 
From 1961-1962 the average membership was reduced to 24 and the 
share capital and loan advanced increased to Rs 26 and Rs 205 per member 
respectively. The Panchayaty system of government was introduced with 
the dissolution of the elected party system of government and the co-
operatives were linked with the Panchayaty administration. 
to the Cooperative Act was made during this period. 
3.4 . 2 The Second Plan 1962 -1965 
Some amendment 
Performance during the second plan was poorer In distribution of 
loan per member per society than the first two plans. The average 
membership , share capital and loan advanced were 26, Rs 84 and Rs 84 
respectively . A land reform program was introduced In 1963. A system 
of compulsory savings was initiated to accumulate the capital for 
agricultural financing through cooperatives. The plan fixed a target 
for organizing 2,200 cooperatives, but at the end of the plan only 542 
cooperatives had been organized and registered. One of the achievements 
of this plan was the establishment of a cooperative bank in 1963, a 
financing institution for agriculture through the cooperative system. 
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3 . 4 . 3 The Third Plan 1966-1970 
During this plan the achievements were also not encouraging; only 
membership had increased . Emphasis had been given to quality aspects 
rather than quantity . A revitalization program was initiated and the 
reorganization and amalgamation of weaker societies was carried out. The 
Cooperative Bank was converted into the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) 
in 1968 to widen the scope of financing to individual farmers as well as 
the cooperatives . 
3.4 . 4 The Fourth Plan 1971-1975 - Supervised Credit Program 
At the beginning of the fourth plan in 1971, HMG approved the 
supervised credit program with a Vlew to making cooperatives efficiently 
operative and responsive to the needs of the rural people (HMG. National 
Planning Commission , 1971 ). Supervised credit is a technical term 
applied to a cooperative system of credit provision which integrates 
adequate and timely credit facilities with farm management guidance, under 
the intensive supervision of technical personnel; the production capacity 
of the farms is determined on the basis of farm plans p repared by trained 
technicians (FAO 1966). Further details of the supervised credit program 
are discussed in Chapter 4. 
3 . 4.5 Organization and Operation of Supervised Cooperatives 
a . Village Level Cooperatives 
Village level cooperatives provide timely loans for crop 
production , bullocks and small implements, and supply agricultural inputs 
ln cash to members and non-members, supply consumer goods for the benefit 
of the farmers , and obtain a wholesale dealership from the concerned 
institution . 
(1) Technical Supports 
The district extension office lS to asslgn at least 
1 
one JTA in each society to prepare farm plans for the members and provide 
them with timely technical guidance at farm level. 
(2 ) Financial Support 
The Agricultural Development Bank at the district 
level provides loans to the cooperatives and the cooperatives to the 
farmers . A subsidy lS provided to the cooperatives for meeting operational 
expenses and godown construction through the ADB by HMG. 
(3 ) Inspection and Audit 
The d istrict cooperative office performs and conducts 
timely inspection and auditing of the accounts of the cooperatives besides 
dealing with promotional and legal aspects . (Further details are supplied 
in Section 3 . 5 . 2 . ) 
The cooperative sUb- inspectors are assigned these 
duties : to visit at least once a month and report to the Registrar on the 
performance . 
(4) Advisory Committee 
An advisory committee consisting of 9 members is 
selected or elected from among the shareholders to advise the cooperative 
manager in day- to-day business . They meet once a month to review the 
program and progress of the cooperative society . 
b . The District Coordinating Committee 
A district coordinating committee consisting of the 
Agricultural Development Officer (ADO), District Cooperative Officer (DCO), 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) , Agricultural Input Corporation (AIC), 
Land Reform Officer (LRO) and District Irrigation Officer (DIO) are formed 
1 A Junior Technical Assistant (JTA) is an Extension Worker who motivates 
the farmers towards improved methods of cultivation. 
33 
to formulate the plans and programs for agricultural development In the 
district. (The main functions are dealt with in Chapter 4.) 
3 . 4.6 Operational Procedures 
The cooperative managers and JTAs jointly see the loan application 
and fill In all the information as provided in a prescribed farm plan by 
the ADO and ADB, after ascertaining the farmer's needs. The completed 
application form is collected by the cooperatives with documents affixed 
including a land ownership certificate and a recent land revenue receipt. 
The preparation of the farm plan and loan application is done one month 
1 before the disbursement of loans. The loans are compiled and put forward 
to the Advisory Committee for detailed review, and then to the district 
Agricultural Development Bank with a summary of individuals indicating 
the items and amounts for approval (ADB 1977). 
a . Analysis and Approval of Loan 
The loan application is analysed by the agricultural expert 
In the ADB . 
. The loan officer visits the area of the cooperative and makes 
a test check on 10% of the total applicants on a random basis and then 
2 forwards a report to the loan committee for approval . The loan committee 
reviews the requirement and approves the loan. The ADB calls in a rep-
resentative of the society to sign the agreement and disbursement is made 
to the cooperative by issuing a supply order for the inputs and a cheque 
for the cash . 
b. Disbursement to the Members 
The cooperative society disburses the loan to member farmers 
1 FAO (1966) suggests farm-planning should be completed one month before 
the actual agricultural operation season starts. 
2 Loan Committee in the district consists of 5 members, chairman of district 
Panchayat administration, ADB manager, ADO , Loan Officer and Accounts 
Officer of the ADB. 
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after signing the agreement with the society about the terms and con-
ditions of the loan and the members ' obligation within the society. The 
managers and extension workers including the bank technicians have a joint 
responsibility for its implementation, supervision and for the technical 
guidance needed by the farmers to effectively utilize the loans. 
3 . 4.7 Ac hi e v ement s of t he Supervi sed Cooperative Prog ram 
The activities and achievements of the supervised cooperative 
program have been presented ln Table 3.2. The target for the organization 
of the supervised cooperatives for the period of four years was fixed at 
251 . The organization and registration of cooperatives was 289 at the 
end of 1975-76. The average change in membership, share capital and loan 
to members is 275 , Rs 34 . 6 and Rs 424 respectively. The average member 
per society is 275 and share capital for the society is Rs 9515 . 
3 . 5 The Fifth Plan and the Sajha Program 
Although the supervised cooperatives were functioning for timely 
provision of credits, inputs and other services, the government realized 
that pre-Sajha cooperatives were not catering for essential services and 
effective mobilization of rural savings at the village level . In May 
1976, HMG introduced a Sajha Program for the benefit of small farmers as 
a part of the rural development program in 30 selected districts . In 
this program 217 supervised cooperatives and 326 new Sajhas including 30 
district cooperative unions have been organized and registered. l 
The objectives of this program include (HMG . Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture 1976) : 
a . to increase national production (GNP) and the 
lncome level of the rural people through modern 
1 Initially 854 new Sajhas were organized , but in the following year they 
were considered as non-viable and h e nce amalgamated into viable un its 
and the total was now 543 (Source: Department of Cooperatives) . 
TABLE 3.2 
ACTIVITIES OF COOPERATIVES DURING THE SUPERVISED 
CREDIT PROGRAM 1972-75 
Activities 
Number of 
Societies 
Membership 
Share Capital 
(Rs) 
1972-73 
169 
38553 -
1187603 
1973-74 
(37) 
206 
(16878) 
55431 
(757720) 
1945323 
1974-75 
(45 ) 
251 
(21990) 
77421 
(716222) 
2661545 
1975-76 Change 
(38) 
289 120 
(8514) 
85935 47382 
(648111) 
3309656 2122053 
Average 
Chang e 
40 
11845 
530513 
Borrowings (Rs) 13697407 
(9705228) (13236583) (-2068333) 20873478 5218370 
23402635 36639218 34570885 
(2637210) (57625017) - (35301073) 
Loan to Members 8504024 
( }~ s ) 11141234 68766251 33465178 24961154 6240288 
Loan Recovered 
( j--; s ) 
Sales of Ag. 
2397286 
(511420 5) 
7511491 
(3487180) (-5453862) 
10998671 5544809 3147523 
Inputs (Rs) 29891621 44131975 87457419 44449795 
Sales of Cons . 
Goods (Rs) 5130558 
Marketing of Ag. 
Produce (Rs) 580366 
Average Member 
per Society (Rs) 228 
Av . Share 
Capital per 
Member (Rs) 30.8 
Av . Loan per 
Member (Rs) 220 
Recovery Rate 28.2 % 
Delinquency 71.8 % 
5140199 22284133 108213 96 
994475 6472602 13485819 
269 308 297 
35 34.40 38.50 
201 888 389 
67.4 % 16.0% 16.5 % 
32.6 % 84 . 0% 83.5% 
786881 
275 
34.6 
424 
32. 0% 
68.0% 
Note: Figures in pare ntheses indicate the change over two periods . 
Source: Derived from HMG , Department of Co-operative 1978. 
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farming , and providing them with credit, supplies 
and marketing outlays; 
b. to provide general lending facilities at the 
village level, collect rural savings and mobilize 
them in development activities; and 
c . to provide loans for small cottage industry In 
the rural areas . 
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All the Sajhas are guided and multipurpose In nature and undertake a wide 
range of activities with priority for agricultural credit. 
3 . 5 .1 Organization of the Sajha program l 
a . Village Level Sajha Ward Sub-Committee 
A Sajha ward sUb-committee is set up in each ward consisting 
of a ward member and two departmental nominees from the Department of 
Cooperatives under the Ministry of Land Reform, HMG. The function of 
the ward sub-committee lS: to collect the compulsory savings from the 
farmers of the wards and deposit them with the Sajha; to collect the loan 
applications from the farmers in the ward and forward them to the Sajha 
through the JTAs; and to assist with loan collection and disbursement 
from the Sajha within the ward. 
b. The Sajha Executive Council 
The Sajha executive council comprising members of each Sajha 
ward sub-committee is formed and consists of 29 members or 58 members. 
This lS the general meeting of the Sajha Society. 
c . The Sajha Society 
There is a Sajha Society In each Panchayat or between two 
Panchayats to provide production and consumption loans, marketing and 
1 HMG. Ministry of Food and Agriculture 1976. 
supply of agricultural inputs; supply of consumer goods; transfer of com-
pulsory savings into share capital and to provide membership certificates 
and provide banking facilities if necessary. 
d . The Board of Directors 
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A Board of Directors consisting of 11 members is constituted 
as a decision making body for day-to-day operations. The daily operation 
of the society is conducted by a cooperative manager appointed by the ADB 
who acts as the secretary to the Board. 
3 . 5 . 2 The District Level Organization 
A district level committee consisting of seven members is con-
stituted to conduct and coordinate the Sajha Program. The members rep-
resented are the District Panchayat Chairman , Land Reform Officer, 
agricultural extension officer , Rice Exporting Company, District Co-
operative Officer , Agricultural Input Corporation officer and the manager 
of the ADB . 
a . Financing Institutions 
The Agricultural Development Bank lS considered as the 
central financing institution for agriculture. Its maln functions are: 
(1) to provide production and consumption loans 
to the farmers directly or through the 
Sajhas; 
(2 ) to supervlse and control the Sajhas; 
(3) to provide general banking facilities and 
mobilize resources by collecting deposits 
from the Sajhas as well as from the farmers; 
and 
(4) to act as a banker for the Sajha societies. 
b . Land Reform Department 
The responsibility of this department is to help collect 
prevlous overdue loans and compulsory savings and deposit them with the 
Sajhas . 
c . Cooperative Department 
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A separate Cooperative Department has been established Slnce 
1953 as the main central government agency of administration and in charge 
of the major activities of cooperatives . The Cooperative Department at 
present is under the Ministry of Land Reform. The regulatory functions 
are governed by the Cooperative Act, 1959 and the subsequent Acts and 
amendments to it . 
The Registrar is empowe red for the implementation of policies 
and overall management of the cooperative movement. The management power 
of the Registrar has been entrusted to the ADB since 1973. 
d . Di strict Extension Office 
Responsibi l ity lS given to the District Extension Office for 
providing technical manpower to the Sajhas . The ADO deputes JTAs to 
each Sajha for technical guidance on the improved method of farming. 
e . Other Institutions 
The Central Bank of Nepal bears the initial expenditure of the 
Sajha for the first four years where general banking functions are per-
formed . The Agricultural Input Corporation provides a monopoly dealership 
of all agricultural inputs for each Sajha in its area of operation. Rice 
exporting companies procure rlce through the Sajhas. The other trading 
agencies also provide a monopoly dealership to the Sajhas. Integrated 
servlces under the Sajha Program are presented In the following two 
figures (3 . 1 and 3.2). 
AIC 
NFC 
STC 
OSO 
Abbreviations: 
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FIGURE 3 .1 
IN'rEGRATION OF SERVICES FROM VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
1 
UNDER THE SAJHA PROGRAM 
DADO Sajha Assembly. 2 
, LRO J} i 
I Sajha Managing 3 
I ~ ~ Committee 
I DCO 
, ~ > : j> ADB Sajha Society , 
I J I 
DCU 11 
Ward Level 
, Sajha Sub -
Committee 
AIC 
NFC 
STC 
OSO 
DADO 
- Agricultural Input Corporation 
- Nepal Food Corporation 
- Salt Trading Corporation 
- Other Service Organization 
- District Agricultura l 
Development Office 
FUNCTIONS 
1. Credit 
2 . Input Supply 
3. Marketing 
4. Supply of 
Consumer Goods 
5. Banking 
Services 
6. Distribution 
of Membership 
> Certificate 
LRO - Land Reform Office 
DCO - District Cooperative 
Office 
ADB - Agricultural 
Development Bank 
DCU - District Cooperative 
Union 
1 See details in Section 3.5.1. 
2 SAJHA ASSEMBLY: The Sajha Assembly is a general body of the total strength 
of the Sajha Executive Council . In principle all members of the Sajha who 
have purchased at least one share are members of the Assembly, but in the 
Sajha Program (which is linked with the Panchayat system of government), 3 
members from among the shareholders (contributing to the compulsory savings) 
are first selected as the ward committee . There are 9 wards in each 
Panchayat , so the strength is then 27 . The chairman and vice chairman are 
then selected separately from among the shareholders of the Sajha Executive 
Council , so the total strength becomes 29 . If the area of the Sajha is of 
two Panchayats , then the total strength is 58 . This strength is called the 
Sajha Assembly. 
3 THE SAJHA MA AGING COMMITTEE: This is the same as the Advisory Committee , 
the function of which is to advise the cooperative manager in the day to day 
operations of the cooperatives. 
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FIGURE 3 . 2 
FLOW OF SERVICES FROM DIFFERENT AGENCIES 
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3 . 5 . 3 The Central Sajha Development Committee 
A central level Sajha development committee is constituted con-
sisting of 12 members under the chairmanship of the Minister for 
Agriculture for policy directions and program consideration. Rep-
resentations are made from the National Planning Commission, Central Bank 
of Nepal and the departments of Land Reform, Industry, Agriculture and 
Commerce . The responsibilities for each institution are assigned 
strictly for an effective implementation of the program. 
3 . 6 Summary 
The modern cooperative is very difficult to describe because of 
the wide variation in its functions and the flexibility in its organization. 
The cooperatives of agricultural producers or workers, which serve agrl-
cultural production and marketing in the rural areas and are registered as 
cooperative societies,are in the legal sense Agricultural Cooperatives. 
The concept of cooperation is classified into three main schools 
of thought : the cooperative enterprise school; the commonwealth school; 
and the socialist cooperative school. The cooperatives in Nepal corne 
under the cooperative enterprise school of thought. The objective of the 
cooperatives in Nepal is to bring about advancement of their members ' 
economic interests. Cooperatives were established In the year 1953, 
however , they began their work with the enactment of the Cooperative Act 
in the year 1959. 
Nepal has so far launched four development plans, but ~chievements 
In the field of cooperatives are not very encouraging due to over-ambitious 
targets and also due to the lack of financial outlay and trained personnel. 
ID1G/Nepal introduced a Sajha Program in Ma y 1 9 76, as a part of the 
Rural Development Program for the b enefit of small farm ers. 
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The Sajha Program is a supervised cooperative credit program, the 
management of which is entrusted to the ADB . The organization of the 
program at the central level is undertaken by the Sajha Development 
Committee ; at the district level by the District Coordinating Committees; 
at the panchayat level by the Sajha Societies and their Boards of Directors; 
and at the village level by the Sajha Ward Sub-Committees and the Sajha 
Executive Committees and the Sajha Executive Councils. Responsibi l ity lS 
assigned to each institution strictly for the effective implementation of 
the program. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE ROLE OF THE COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 
IN NEPALESE AGRICULTURE 
In this chapter an attempt is made to look at two aspects. 
1 
Firstly , to describe aspects of demand for credit: why Nepalese people 
want credit; where they get it from; what terms and conditions are 
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imposed upon them; and what institutional supports have been made for the 
benefit of farmers in the country. The second section examines the 
credit supply from institutional sources . 
4.1 The Demand for Agricultural Credit Services 
As traditional farming breaks into the transitional period of 
improved technology the additional cost burden is generally met with 
credit from institutional sources (Firth and Yamey 1964). 
The introduction of HYV and improved methods Qf cultivation have 
become expenSlve ; farmers do not have sufficient funds to meet these 
expenses, so they depend upon borrowed funds from institutional sources 
(ADB and the Sajha). The farmers borrow funds when their own capital 
has a high marginal value productivity (MVP) and continue borrowing to 
the point where the MVP of the last unit of credit is equal to its cost. 
The cost of credit refers to the effective interest cost and other expen s e s 
associated with the process of borrowing (Long 1968). 
4.1.1 Purpose of Borrowing 
Farmers in the rural ar eas usually seem to have borrowed for t he 
following p urp o ses: 
1 Demand for cred it , in t r adit i onal agricul tura l societies , is a combination 
of man y complex f actors . Demand for credit to pur chase agricultura l 
inp ut s i s a derived demand, whil e demand for c r edit t o mee t certain social 
obligations a nd o ther consumpt i on expenditur e be l ongs to a d ifferent 
category . Du e t o t he compl e x ity of t he p r oblem and the l ack of detail ed 
data , the empir i ca l estimates of supp l y and d emand o f credit are not under -
take n in t h is thesis . However , some aspects of the factors a f fecting 
s uppl y and demand fo r institut ional credi are described in th i s chapter. 
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the point where the MVP of the last unit of credit is equal to its cost. 
The cost of credit refers to the effective interest cost and other expenses 
associated with the process of borrowing (Long 1968). 
4.1.1 Purpose of Borrowing 
Farmers in the rural areas usually seem to have borrowed for the 
following purposes: 
1 Demand for credit, In raditional agricultural societies, is a combination 
of many complex factors . Demand for credit to purchase agricultural 
inputs is a derived demand, while demand for credit to meet certain social 
obligations and other consumption expenditure belongs to a different 
category. Due to the complexity of the problem and the lack of detailed 
data, the empirical estimates of supply and d e mand of credit are not under-
taken in this thesis. However, some aspects of the factors affecting 
supply and demand for institutional credit are described in this chapter. 
a. 
b. 
Farming expenditure: 
(1) purchase of inputs; 
(2) payment of wages; 
(3) operational costs; and 
(4) payment of rents, etc . 
Capital expenditure: 
(1) irrigation purposes (digging wells and 
repair); 
(2) purchase of livestock and poultry; 
and 
(3) purchase of land. 
c . Consumption purposes. 
d. Others: repayment of old debts . 
The institutions which cater for the financial needs of the farming 
community are the ADB at the apex level and the Sajhas at the grassroot 
level . 
credit. 
4.1.2 Supply of Agricultural Inputs 
Fertilizer is the main agricultural input for which farmers need 
Nepal does not produce chemical fertilizer and her requirements 
are met through overseas imports. These imports are a monopoly of the 
government agency, the Agricultural Inputs Corporation (AIC). The 
fertilizer distribution system consists of the AIC and the district co-
operative union and the village Sajha (Rastra Bank 1977). 
The AIC has been in operation under different names Slnce 1966 
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and through it the government controls fertilizer marketing and distribution. 
With the introduction of supervised cooperatives in 1971 and the Sajha 
Program in 1976, private dealership has been abolished. The demand for 
fertilizer is assumed to depend upon its price: movement of international 
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price influences fertilizer price In Nepal , which also affects the use of 
fertilizer and demand for credit among the member farmers through the 
Sajhas. 
The distribution of fertilizer is also a monopoly: fertilizer 
lS sold by the Arc to the district cooperative unions and only through it 
to the Sajha and then through the Sajha to the farmers. 
<
sajha 
ArC~' --~)DCU 
Farmers 
The cooperative unlons were created under the Cooperative Society 
Act, 1959 and its members are all the primary Sajhas in the districts. 
The district cooperative union performs the following functions: 
a. procurement and sales of agricultural inputs; 
b. procurement and sales of consumer goods; 
c. acts as a wholesale dealer for all 
agricultural inputs from the ArC; and 
d. acts as commission agent for collecting 
agricultural produce. 
The cooperative unions work under the guidance of the advisory committee 
and the ADB. The Sajha Societies cover all the village Panchayats and 
the unions cover the Sajhas. 
The Sajha Societies provide credit to those farmers who are 
willing to adopt improved me thods of cUltivation . Besides fertilizer, 
its lending components consist of seed, implements and pesticides. 
4.1.3 The Commission Rate and its Payment 
The commission given by the Arc to the DCU is 6 % of the sale 
value of fertilizer if lifted In a peak season. The slack season carries 
• •• • 'I I. • I J , ." .... J ~ ..... 
9 . 5% commlSSlon. This system was introduced to encourage the lifting of 
fertilizer during the slack season when weather and transportation are 
easy (Rastra Bank 1977). The Sajhas get 5% from the DCD as commission. 
Payment mechanism. Fertilizers are sold for coupons from the 
ADB as well as for cash. The ADB issues fertiliz e r coupons (attached to 
Appendix 2) to its customers for the approved amount of loan specifying 
the amount of credit approved , the goods against which the coupon is 
valid and the name of the suppliers. 
The farmers get their inputs either from the DCD or from the 
Sajha according to their convenience. 
the ADB against the coupon . 
4.1.4 Marketing 
The final payments are made by 
One of the objectives of the Sajha Program is to conduct the 
marketing of agricultural produce through the Sajhas to give a better 
prlce at the time of harvest to the member farmers. Unless the farmers 
get a better prlce for their produce the mere extending of credit and 
imparting of extension education has little value. In spite of many 
46 
efforts, marketing through the Sajhas could not be conducted due to many 
technical deficiencies in such things as storage, grading, skilled managers , 
shrinkage and transportation. 
4 . 2 Institutional Relationships for Cooperative Credit 
A basic consideration which determines the role of the Sajhas 
(cooperatives) in the economic and social development of Nepal is the 
mutually supportive relationship with other institutions engaged in 
agricultural development in rural areas . This supportive relationship 
refers to the creation and maintenance of suitable linkages, particularly 
with the Agricultural Extension Servic e , the Agricultural Development Bank, 
• • • '" II'. I.f I' '" .' .. 14 4 
4 7 
the Agricultural Inputs Corporation, the Cooperative Department, 
agricultural marketing agencies and district cooperative unions . It is 
through these linkages that cooperative members can have access to lm-
proved farming practices , credit, input supplies and marketing outlets 
(Whitaker 1973). 
The cooperatives In Nepal have been established with two ob-
jectives , the first to enable the member farmers to have access to goods, 
inputs , credit and services to enhance their productive capacity and 
improve their level of living and the second to develop a self-reliance 
for both individual and cooperative advancement by the governmental 
supportive programs of national development (HMG 1975). The structure 
and functions of the extension services and institutional credit agencles 
and the guidance of cooperative departments must receive careful con-
sideration in the development of cooperatives so as to ensure the effective 
coordination and evaluation of the growth of cooperatives as self-generating 
enterprises (FAO 1974) . 
4 . 2.1 Supervision of Loans 
Mere provision of loans to the farmers does not make any sense if 
the loan is not properly utilised for the purposes for which it was dis-
bursed . Pre- and post-loan supervision are exercised by the ADB and Sajha 
Societies and the reports are submitted to the district coordination 
committee through the ADB to ensure that the loans are given judiciously 
by the ADB to the Sajhas and by the Sajhas to their member farmers so that 
maximum possible yields and benefits from the use of loans be obtained, 
and also that cooperative loans are recovered in time and in the full 
amount to give a higher turnover. 
· f. _ •• _·'1'. "" I' " .••...••.•• --
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4.2 . 2 Accounts Auditing 
The main component for the success of a cooperative society is 
the proper maintenance of its books and accounts of transaction. Each 
cooperative manager is supposed to keep up-to-date records of share 
capital, a membership register , a loan disbursement register, a loan due 
register , a repayment register, a stock and sale register, an assets 
register , a minute book, loan bonds, etc. and be open to inspection to 
each member during working hours . A double entry system of accountancy 
has been practised since the management carne to the Agricultural Development 
Bank (ADB). 
The rules regarding the financing of cooperative s o c i et i es inter 
alia provide for the audit of each cooperative society twice a year soon 
after the half-yearly closing . 
him acts on his behalf . 
The Registrar or the person appointed by 
An auditor examines the business transaction financial position 
and the quality of management and record keeping and assesses the overall 
performance. Two copies of reports are sent to the Registrar for 
scrutiny . After the Registrar 1S satisfied with the audit note a copy 
duly signed by him is forwarded to the society to which it pertains. A 
copy of the audit report is made available to the ADB for examination and 
reconciliation. The general meeting is held once a year, the audit 
report is approved by the general meeting. 
4 . 3 Terms and Conditions 
Cooperative credit 1S made available to small owne rs or tenant 
farmers who are members of the Sajha Society. The standing crop and the 
tenancy certificate is taken as a security against loans; besides this the 
borrower has to sign a bond for the amount borrowed and the terms and 
conditions of repayment. 
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4.3.1 Interest Rates 
The ADB loans out to cooperatives at 4-11% interest and the co-
operative loans to farmers at 6-14% depending upon the purpose of the 
loan . All short term loans bear 14% and medium loans 6-11%. To service 
charge lS taken from cooperatives. The rates of interest charged by 
private money lenders are much higher (10-50%) than those charged by 
institutional sources (IBRD 1975, ADB/N 1978) (See Table 4.1). 
Prior to the Sajha Program the interest rates charged by the 
institutional source were 4-10%. It has been realized by the planners 
that these low interest rates do not cover the costs of supply of credit 
and also does not equate the supply and demand for institutional funds 
(Adams 1973). 
Rajkrishna (1979) states that there are three important components 
of an economlC rate of interest which the loans made available to small 
farmers should c over : 
R . the opportunity cost of capital (8%); 
b . the administrative costs (3-5 %); and 
c . the cost of risk and default (4%). 
He further argued that there are three more aspects of the terms on which 
the loans are made available to small farmers: 
a . the interest rates to be charged; 
b . the collateral required; and 
c . the recovery schedule. 
It is the view of many economists that In general very low interest rates 
are undesirable. They can cause large farmers to over-invest in equipment, 
re-lend at higher interest rates and reduce the returns (Dantwala 1966, 
Colyer and Guillerme 1971). 
TABLE 4.1 
INTEREST RATES CHARGED BY THE ADB AND COOPERATIVES 
ADB Sajha to 
Purpose to Individual 
Sajha Farms 
i/yr l 
Special Projects a 4% 6% a . 
b . Cardamon , Hort., Tea, Cotton 4 % 8% 
c . Livestock & Animal Husb . 7% 11% 
d. Based Industry b 7 % 11% Agro 
e . Other Agricultural Loans 11 % 14% 
Notes : a Construction of farm level storage and the 
establishment of Gobar gas plant . 
b Fixed capital only . 
Source: ADB 1978. 
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As against these arguments, there are some points ln favour of 
low interest rates , l.e., they accelerate the diffusion of motivation 
and the use of modern inputs thereby increasing production ln the economy. 
Although it is difficult to balance this argument of low interest 
rates with a priori reasoning, the rates of interest must be lower than 
the private moneylenders' rates and also should cover the opportunity cost 
and the cost of administration and risk bearing (Rajkrishna 1979). 
4.4 Institutional Supports 
4.4.1 Agricultural Extension Service at Present 
Agricultural extension is carried out through the District 
Agricultural Development Office headed by a District Agricultural Develop-
ment Officer (DADO), who is in charge of the district extension workers 
including a number of junior technicians (JTs) and junior technical 
assistants (JTAs). 
Most of the district extension offices are poorly staffed and 
the majority of assistant level technicians (JTs and JTAs) hold only high 
school certificate with some additional training in the agricultural field 
by the Institute of Agriculture. 
The District Agricultural Development Officers (DADOs) are re-
quired to carry their program to the village level. They are responsible 
for technical information, providing JTAs with the motivating force to aid 
the farmers and help in organization at the village level. The objective 
of the extension service is to motivate the people to meet their general 
goals by utilizing the services , technical information and resources 
available within the various departments and organizations of the government. 
The benefits of modern agricultural knowledge become meaningful 
only if the farmers make use of it at their farms . The extension workers 
are responsible for carrying such knowledge to the farmers through the 
Sajhas . 
4 . 4 . 2 District Coordinating Committees 
District coordinating committees are formed to carry out the 
guidance and direction of central policy. The DCC members consist of 
ADB, AIC , LRO , COO , 010 , marketing organizations, DCO and DCU. The 
committee sees that the extension activities are carried out within the 
districts . The DCC receives broad policy guidelines from the central 
government through the secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture . 
The main functions of the DCC are (EAPD 1972) : 
a. t o prepare an agricultural development program 
for the distr ict; 
b . to establish coordination among various 
departmental representatives in the districts; 
c . to make arrangements for agricul tural inputs , 
and credits in time to the farmers; 
d . to mobilize compulsory savings; and 
e . to supervise and follow up the agricultural 
development program being run in the district. 
4 . 4 . 3 The Implementation Team 
The District Coordinating Committee (DCC) members form a team and 
make a tour of varlOUS Panchayats of the districts (especially where Sajhas 
are operating) to help to implement and maintain the Sajha Program and 
educate the farmers about the cooperative principle either by conducting 
a mass meeting or by individual contact . 
The team make an on-the-spot study of the program and bring 
practical problems to the notice of the DCC for their discussion and timely 
solution . 
The cooperative society staff are eligible for bonuses from the 
net profit . Bonuses so distributed are not to exceed their two month 
basic salary . Village level extension workers are the maln components 
for lending and recovery of loans. There is provision for commissions 
of 0 . 5% if overdue loans are recove red by their efforts. 
4 . 4.4 Education of Cooperative Members 
The cooperative pioneers like Dr W. King and Rochdale have 
stressed that continuous education about the cooperative principles for 
cooperators is one of the main objectives of cooperatives. It is 
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believed that a society which has once formally grasped the main principles 
and acts on its knowledge will be truly cooperative and the fact that it 
is managed on cooperative lines will constitute the factor most important 
In its financial position (Mac Lagan Committee 1915) . 
The maln constituents of the cooperative management are: 
a . the officials of the cooperative departments and 
ADB who help and guide the movement; 
b . the employees of cooperative societies who conduct 
day-to-day operations; 
c. the members and office bearers who form and run 
the society and enjoy equal rights; 
d . the DCC who form a team and make visits to the 
area and educate the farmers; and 
e . the cooperative training centre. 
If any of these is ignorant about the phi losophy, principles and practices 
of cooperatives the whole movement is like the 'blind leading the blind ' 
(Sinha 1 964) . 
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4.4.5 Present Arrangements 
Education of members is conducted by the DCC team by organizing 
a mass meeting before and after the registration of the society, and dis-
cussions with the member farmers about the principles and advantages of 
cooperation and the problems of the society. 
To impart education to the employees , a cooperative training 
centre has been established in 1963 to prepare the skilled manpower re-
quired for cooperative development and to educate members on various 
aspects. The duration of courses vary from a few weeks to 6 months. 
The cooperative managers, sub-inspectors, auditors, inspectors and the 
cooperative officers are the main participants. 
For the education of the members of the advisory committee a 
short-duration (3-day) seminar is organized at the village level and 
practical problems and solutions are discussed with the DCC team. The 
main discussions consist of the meaning and advantage of cooperation, the 
management of Sajha Societies and the rights and obligations of members 
and the advisory committee. (See p.32, Section 3.4.5(4)). 
4.5 The Supply of Cooperative Credit 
4.5.1 Rural Savings 
In order to provide more r esources for agri c ultura l credit, HMG 
introduced a system of compulsory savings in 1964 during land reform. 
Every landowner, tenant and landowner-cum-tenant had to contribute at 
30 kg/ha compulsorily either in cash or kind. I~1G was committed to pay 
5% interest on the savings which could be refunded in 5 years or converted 
into the share capital of the societies under this program (ADB 1977). 
The mobilization of rural saving has taken place through the 
Sajhas in the following way: 
a. accumulation of rural savings by way of deposits; 
b. collection of compulsory savings; and 
c . a sizeable lncrease in the share capital by 
government, Central Bank and other commercial 
banks as well as borrowers. 
4 . 5.2 Urban Savings 
The Agricultural Credit Survey Board, 1972, recommended that 
financing institutions (ADB and the Sajhas) should offer attractive 
interest rates on deposits to mobilize funds . Rural and urban savings 
cannot be attracted to the banking system unless the rates offered are 
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higher than those prevailing in the urban money market. The higher rates 
of interest on deposits in the rural sector may result in some diversion 
of funds from the urban sector (Rastra Bank 1972) . The prevailing rate 
at present is 13% on time savings. 
On the recommendation of the Survey Board , short term credit 
interest rates for l e nding were raised to 14% to cover the increased cost 
of resources and the higher rates on deposits. It has been assumed that 
the farmers are less concerned about rates of interest charged rather than 
the adequacy , timeliness and easy availability of a loan. Besides, the 
rates charged by the private moneylenders are so high that even if the 
rates charged by the institutions were raised a little the gap between 
the two rates would still be significant . 
4.5.3 Banking Facilities 
In order to provide banking facilities at the grass roots level 
and to mobilize rural savings through the medium of the Sajha, the ADB was 
asked to extend its primary sub-branch offices in rural areas into those 
30 selected districts where commercial banks do not exist. Sixty prlmary 
sub-branch offices have been established performing the following 
functions (Appendix 3): 
a. to provide production and consumption loans 
directly to the farmers or through the Sajha; 
b. to provide effective supervision and control 
of the Sajha; 
c. to provide general banking facilities and 
mobilize resources by collecting time deposits 
from the Sajha and farmers; 
d. to make the financial programs of the banks 
effective by increasing the volume of business 
through the Sajha; and 
e . to act as the banker of the Sajha . 
4 . 6 Summary 
Sajhas provide loan to those farmers who are willing to adopt 
improved methods of cUltivation . This improved farming is expensive, 
and small farmers usually do not have sufficient funds to meet these 
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expenses . They depend on borrowed funds from the institutional sources. 
The loans are advanced in cash and kind on 6-14% interest per annum 
depending upon the type of loan. 
Fertilizers and improved seeds are the maln components of 
borrowing by the farmers through the Sajha. The fertilizers in Nepal are 
imported from overseas through the government agent (AlC). The distribution 
system consists of the AlC at the apex and the unions and the Sajhas at the 
village level . 
A supportive relationship lS created in the district among the 
institutions involved In agricultural development in the rural areas, to 
provide access to extension services, credit and agricultural input 
supplies, marketing and education to the member farmers. 
Pre- and post-loan supervision are exercised by the financial 
institutions and the reports are submitted to the DCC to ensure that the 
loans are utilized properly by the farmers . Inspection and aUditing of 
records of the Sajhas are carried out by the Cooperative Department and 
the report is sent to the registrar for detailed scrutiny and the final 
audit report is approved by the general meetings . 
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CHAPTER 5 
SAJHA EFFICIENCY INDICATORS: STATISTICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter the details of the statistical results which test 
the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1 are discussed. Two non-parametric 
and two parametric techniques (as mentioned in Chapter 2) have been used 
to analyse the performance of the Sajha Program. The coefficient of 
variation has been computed to compare the variation of distribution of 
loans and delinquencies within the group of different sizes of farm holding. 
5 . 1 The Sample 
As mentioned In earlier chapters, the total number of Sajhas 
covered in the sample are 30, of which 11 are in the Hills, 15 In the 
Plains (dealing with credit, supply of goods and services) and four 
District Cooperative Unions (dealing only with supply of inputs). The 
summary statistics of the activities relating to these Sajhas are presented 
in Table 5.1. 
5.1.1 Change in Area Coverage 
The cooperative system in Nepal has not considered the effective 
cUltivated area under its area of operation . It covers only the geo-
graphical area, the unit being a Panchayat (a local administrative unit 
which usually covers three to five villages depending on its location and 
population density). 
The pre-Sajha situation was one of supervised credit cooperatives, 
the general concept being that one cooperative should cover an average of 
2 .5 Panchayats (Review Committee Report 1968). 
TABLE 5 . 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ACTIVITIES OF 30 S~lPLE SAJHA SOCIETIES , 1978 
N 26 N 4 Rs 
* Before the Program After the Program 
Actlvities Before the Program After the Program 
1>lean Std . Dev . t-1in . Max. Mean Std . Dev . Min . t-lax . Nean Sb::l. Dev . ~lin . 
Ar Coveraqea 
Household 
Coverageb 
Membershipc 
Share Capital 
(000) 
Non-delinquent 
Loan (000) 
Delinquent Loan 
4 . 8 
63 
291 
16.8 
6~ . 
(000) 64 . 3 
Total Loan 
Outstandlng(000)129.4 
Cornml~sion (000) 12.4 
Interest (000 ) 4 . 5 
Financ]al 
Turnover (000) 225.2 
ProhL (000) 
Expendi.t.ure 
(000) 
Shure Capital 
per Member 
Non-delinquent 
-1. 5 
13.8 
58 
LOdn per Member 240 
DelinquenL Loan 
per Member 
Total 1.,o<1n 
OuLstanclin 
per Member 
Financ ial Turn-
220 
444 
ov per 1>lcmber 774 
2 . 3 
497 
197 
32 . 5 
86 . 8 
57 . 5 
101 
.7 
2 . 8 
223 . 6 
11. 
8. 
2 . 0 
120 
35 
12 . 0 
1600 
985 
2 . 4 
796 
51 
1.1 
477 
320 
3 . 7 173.6 132 . 5 146 
1.6 371.6 128 . 8 102 
6 . 6 243.3 72 . 5 46 . 4 
28 . 5 453.5 201 . 4 138 
O. 
3.2 
14 . 3 
-41 . 6 
2.3 
36 . 
14.6 
1100 
25 . 2 
16.6 11.2 
4 . 5 8.0 
446 1075 
5 . 4 12 . 7 
51.517 . 311.2 
255 
248 
140 
388 
860 
Notes: Std.Dev. Standard Deviation a 
Min. t>1ini.mum b 
Max. Maximum c 
* UNIONS N 4 
1.0 
300 
35 
7 . 0 
1800 
1171 
3.7 550 . 4 
22 . 6 440 
29.4 256 . 5 
73.6 
1.2 
1.8 
20 
-1.8 
6.1 
96 
40.7 
57.5 
5660 
32 . 0 
58.2 
Panchayats 
32 7.4 
21. 7 5 . 1 
13 . 3 16 . 0 
329 4 00 
25.4 6 . 4 
52.5 23 . 0 
104 
15 
228 
1.4 
37.5 21.6 
21 
15 
1.1 
59 . 9 
20.8 
29 . 0 
726 
7.9 
21.1 
Number of Households per Sajha 
Number of Members 
Max . 1ean Std . Dev . Nin. 
37 42 6 . 4 
27 31. 7 4 . 9 
35 . 3 13.3 16 . 0 
924 626 . 4 402 
50 . 8 
84 . 2 
1237 
15 . 1 
69.1 
26 . 3 5.2 
67.8 26 
35.4 8.6 
32 . 4 17.4 
34 
27 
1.1 
57.5 
22 . 5 
46.6 
27.7 
18 . 7 
Max . 
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37 
35.4 
99 
30 
43.1 
56.8 
lJl 
') 
(0 
TABLE 5 . 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ACTIVITIES OF 11 SAMPLE SAJHA SOCIETIES IN THE HILLS 
Activities 
Area Coverage 
Household Coverage 
Membership 
Before Program 
Mean Std.Dev . Min . 
4 
708 
230 
10.1 
1.3 
556 
128 
5.0 
3 
120 
35 
3.7 
Max . 
7 
1600 
437 
17.4 Share Capital (000) 
Non-delinquent Loan (000) 
Delinquent Loan (000) 
82.8 100.0 15.5 371.7 
40.3 22.3 6 .6 81.9 
Total Loan Outstanding (000)115.8 118.2 28.6 453.6 
Commission (000 ) 
Interest (00 0 ) 
10.8 
3.4 
8.2 
3.6 
Financial Turnover (000) 187.7 143.4 
0 .9 
0 .8 
14.2 
Profit (000) 
Expenditure (000 ) 
Share Capital per Member 
Non-delinquent Loan per 
Member 
Delinquent Loan per Member 
Total Loan Outstanding/ 
Member 
Financ ial Turnover per 
Member 
Note : Std . Dev . = standard 
-0.2 
11.0 
44 
360 
175 
503 
816 
deviation 
Min . = Minimum 
Max . = Maximum 
(000) = NR3 In 
thousands 
7.6 -10.8 
3.5 2.3 
27.1 
13.6 
502 
14.9 
16.0 
After Program 
Mean Std .Dev . Min . 
3 1 .5 
973 613 
431 292 
35 . 2 51 .4 
134.7 110 . 9 
71.9 62.8 
206.6 169.4 
5.9 4.9 
1 6.9 12.6 
242 167.5 
9 . 6 14.1 
13.2 4 .4 
82 
312 
166 
480 
561 
2 
300 
35 
3.7 
44 . 8 
29.5 
86.9 
2.6 
1.2 
20 
-6.7 
6.5 
Rs 
Max. 
7 
1800 
956 
181.8 
440 
256 .5 
696 .3 
20.9 
40.7 
564 
32 
19.3 
6 1 
TABLE 5.3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ACTIVITIES OF 15 SAMPLE SAJHA SOCIETIES IN THE PLAINS 
Rs 
Before the Program After the Program 
Activities 
Mean Std.Dev . Min. Max. Mean Std . Dev . Min. Max. 
Area Coverage 55 . 3 2.7 2 12 2.1 0 . 64 1 4 
f~useho1d Coverage 593 468 120 1600 678 334 400 1600 
1embership 335 229 97 985 583 334 91 1171 
Sh re Capital (000 ) 21. 8 42 . 5 4 . 2 173.6 203 . 8 152 . 6 8 . 7 550. 3 
Non-delinquent Loan ( 000 ) 60 . 6 77.7 1 . 6 31 3 . 8 1 24.5 98 . 7 22.6 315. 8 
D linquent Loan 78 .7 67.5 10.5 243.3 72 . 9 31.9 39.5 133.1 
To a1 Loan Outstanding (000 ) 1 39 . 3 89 . 5 35 . 9 355.7 197 . 5 116.2 73.7 445. 1 
Commis sion (000 ) 1 3. 5 10.7 1 . 6 36 . 9 16.4 10.5 1.6 33. 7 
In erest Earned (000 ) 5 . 3 2.2 3 . 2 10 . 7 6 . 3 3.1 2 . 2 13. 4 
Financ ial Turnover (000 ) 252 . 7 269 . 7 16 . 9 1100 595 . 5 1401 21.8 5660 
Profit (000 ) - 2.5 14.5 -4 . 2 25 . 2 2.4 11 . 2 -18 . 2 25. 9 
Expendi ture (000 ) 1 5 . 9 11 . 0 5 . 6 51.5 20 . 3 13.8 6.1 58. / 
Share Capita l per Member 65 350 
Non-delinquent Loan per Member 1 80 213 
Delinquency per Member 235 125 
'fatal Loan Outstanding per 
Member 415 339 
Financ ial Turnover per Member 754 1021 
No e: Std.Dev . standard = 
deviation 
Min . = inimum 
ax . = Maximum 
(000) = NRs In 
thousand 
The area coverage under one cooperative prlor to 1976 ranged 
from two to twelve Panchayats , the lowest being Dhanagarhi District in 
far western Nepal , and the highest Dang also In the same region. The 
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average (the mean) is 4.8 Panchayats. With the introduction of the Sajha 
Program in 1976 the emphasis was on an effective area coverage based on 
land type and population density, the expectation being no more than two 
Panchayats under one society . If any Panchayat does not have a society, 
a separate society would be established . Difficulties still arise in 
the Hills because of lack of transportation facilities and the geographical 
situation, where one Panchayat can be as big as one full day's walk of 
steep hills. 
The area coverage has now been reduced to a range of 1-7 
Panchayats with an average of 2.48. 
5 .1. 2 Change in Household Coverage 
The usual understanding of the Sajha Program is that it is a part 
of the rural development program prepared as an ad hoc program, to provide 
access to credit and production factors for the small and medium farmers 
on the spot with easy terms. The strategy was adopted to ensure an 
effective coverage of all households in the area of operations of the Sajhas. 
Prior to the Sajhas the household per society ranged from 120-
1,600 with an average of 639 households per society. After the intro-
duction of the Sajha Program, all contributions to compulsory savings 
were transferred into the share capital of the Sajha Societies: every 
household contributing to the compulsory savings became a member. So the 
household coverage has increased to an average of 796 with a range 300 to 
1,800 households . 
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5 .1.3 Change In Membership 
Membership is the main component of the cooperative principle 
indicating the active participation of member farmers in the program. 
In 1975, cooperative society membership ranged from 35 to 985 members 
with an average of 291 members. The number of members per society in 
the Hills is lower than those located in the Plains. After the Sajha 
1 Program, membership ranges from 35 to 1171 with an average of 519 members. 
Societies located in the Hills still could not increase their membership 
to any significant extent. The maximum number of members are In a 
society located in the Plains (Janakpur). Before the Program each 
individual member had to pay Rs 50.00 (the value of one share) to be a 
member of the society. After the Program each cultivator contributing 
to compulsory savlngs (an amount exceeding Rs 50.00) is entitled to be 
a member and is eligible to recelve serVlces from the Sajha. Members 
contributing less than Rs 50.00 have to pay the difference to the value 
of one share. 
5.1.4 Change In Share Capital 
Share capital lS another component of the cooperative principle; 
prior to the Sajha Program the average share capital per society was Rs 
16,867 ranging from Rs 3,700 to Rs 173,650. (The maximum amount was 
recorded in the society which was organized at the start of the cooperative 
system in the Rapti Valley.) Share capital per member is Rs 58.00. 
Transfer of compulsory savings into share capital is the main feature of 
the Sajha Program ; there has been a drastic increase In share capital 
slnce the introduction of Sajha. Share capital ranges from Rs 3,700 to 
Rs 550 , 360 and the average is Rs 132,464. Share capital per member is 
Rs 255 . 00. 
1 As explained earlier , all households contributing to the compulsory 
savings are treated as members of the Sajha . Therefore the number of 
households covered by the Sajha is greater than the number of members. 
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5.1.5 Change In Loan Outstanding and Delinquency 
Local farmers In the rural area usually Vlew the Sajha as a 
lending institution for agricultural purposes. The main activities of 
the Sajha can be regarded as financing production loans (short term, 6-18 
months) , and facility loans (medium term, 1-3 years for the purchase of 
a pair of bullocks , livestock and small implements) to those members who 
wish to adopt improved methods of cultivation . The members are required 
to produce tangible assets as security for medium term loans. 
The average loan outstanding prior to the introduction of the 
Sajha Program was Rs 129 , 395 ranging from Rs 28,567 to Rs 453,571, and 
Rs 444 . 00 per member . The smallest lending is in the Hills and the 
largest in the Plains (Tables 5 . 2 and 5 . 3) . 
In the post - Sajha period there has not been any increase of loan 
outstanding in relativ e terms but there has been an increase in absolute 
terms . The average lending per society is Rs 201 , 380 ranging from 
Rs 73 , 682 to 696 , 300 and per member total loan outstanding is Rs 388.00. 
The maximum lending is in the Hills in Kathmandu valley. The reason is 
that 1976 was celebrated as an agricultura l year and the society started 
providing a medium term loan for dairy production to their members in the 
Kathmandu valley . 
The non-delinquent loan also indicates the current lending except 
for medium term loans. Prior to Sajha the average non-delinquent loan 
was Rs 69 , 981 ranging from Rs 1,600 to Rs 371 , 952 or Rs 240.00 per member. 
After Sajha, lending increased to an average Rs 128,875 ranging from Rs 
22 , 617 to Rs 439 , 845. The highest lending was recorded in Kathmandu 
valley . Non-delinquent loans per member was Rs 248.00 . 
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Delinquency indicates the interest of the farmers in the co-
operative system and also the efficiency of the staff in collection. 
Delinquency in this study refers to any delay of repayment of the loans 
from the member borrowers in due time to the cooperative and to the 
Agricultural Development Bank by the cooperatives. 
Before the Sajha Program the delinquency per society was 
Rs 64 , 364 ranging from Rs 6 , 668 to Rs 243 , 338 . The delinquency per 
member was Rs 220 . 00. 
The trends in delinquency even after the Sajha Program appear to 
be increasing in absolute terms . The average delinquency is Rs 72,505 
ranging from Rs 29 , 488 to Rs 256 , 455 . The per member rate has decreased to 
Rs 140 . 00 . The amount does not indicate how long the delinquency has 
been carried forward . The Sajha Program tried to introduce the marketing 
of agricultural produce through the Sajhas but in practice due to many 
technical difficulties most of the Sajhas could not handle this. Ob-
viously the members sold their produce on the open market and did not 
repay the loans voluntarily. 1 
5 . 1 . 6 Change in Financial Turnover 
Financial turnover , apart from lending operations, refers to the 
buying and selling of agricultural inputs, consumer goods and agricultural 
produce on a commission basis for the corporation concerned by the Sajha. 
The average financial turnover per society under pre-Sajha conditions was 
1 It has been observed that Sajhas have many technical difficulties in 
procuring agricultural produce from the farmers including prices, un -
trained staff, storage problems and delivery systems for which they are 
blamed . oreover , if the farmers sell their produce through the Sajhas 
they get their money after deduction of the repayment instal ents in 
repayment of loans taken from the Sajha. On the other hand if their 
produce is sold on the open market they can escape the repayment of 
loans temporarily . 
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Rs 225 , 235 ranging from 143 , 000 to Rs 1 , 100,000. After the Program the 
average financial turnover comes to Rs 446,000 ranglng from 20,000 to 
5 , 660 , 000 . The increase in financial turnover is not from the selling 
of production factors but from dealing with rice collection as a commlSS1on 
agent for the Rice Export Company which was organized in 1976. 
5 . 1 . 7 Change in Profit and Losses 
One basic measure of the viability of the cooperative system 1n 
Nepal is its financial profit over the year. Although profit making 1S 
not the objective ln principle, Sajhas are motivated towards serVlces to 
their members . But if they have to surVlve 1n the long run the society 
must operate at least at the break-even point . 
The ma l n components of income are the margln from the interest 
(3% on short term loans ), membership fee (Rs 2.00 per member first entrance), 
comm1SSlon whi le dealing with inputs, consumer goods and agricultural 
produce . 
The expenses of the Sajha include the salary and allowances to 
the staff , interest on loans and deposits , rents for godowns and buildings, 
transportation costs , stationery, stamps and fuel. 
Most of the Sajha Societies on average recorded losses except 
the few guided societies ln the past. The average loss was Rs 1,500. 
Profits ranged from loss of Rs-4,100 to Rs+25,200. Since the Sajha Program 
the societies have become profitable, with an average profit of Rs 5,400, 
ranging from a loss of Rs-l,800 to a profit of Rs 32,000. 
5 . 2 Comparison of the Sajha Program with the Pre-Sajha Situation 
As indicated in Chapter 1, Section 1.3, we have hypothesized 
that there has been an improvement in the credit function of the Sajha 
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Societies with the introduction of the supervised Sajha Program which has 
led to greater use of credi t , profitability and financial turnover . 
The activities of 26 sample societies have been compared with 
. . . 1 
the pre-SaJha sltuatlon. 
As expl ained In Chapter 2 , Section 2 .1, a slgn test has been used 
to compare the differences between the pre-Sajha and post-Sajha situations 
for hypotheses one and two to get an idea of whether or not a change has 
occurred between these two periods. 
The direction of the difference has been noted by the slgns + 
and - and the matched pairs dropped from the observation numbers. The 
results of the sign test are presented in Table 5.4 . 
All the performance indicators of change confirm our first two 
hypotheses with a 5% level of confidence except income, expenditure and 
profit measures . Since we are assigning only a sign to each activity of 
the Sajha , this does not indicate the significance and magnitude of the 
change . 
5 . 2 .1 The Comparison of Means of the Number of Activities 
To overcome the significance and magnitude of change, a comparison 
of the means of the variables in the two periods has been conducted by 
using a paired t-test for equality and inequality of the means. The 
1 The total number of the sample under study is 30, out of which 26 Sajha 
Societies perform distribution of credit , supply of a~ricultural inputs 
and supply of consumer goods . The 4 district cooperative unions who 
operate in the district headquarters covering the entire district are 
involved in the distribution of agricultural inputs and consumer goods 
only . However , they are included while carrying out the sign test to 
assess the overall performance of the Sajhas . Then, the four unions 
are dropped from the sample because they do not deal with credit 
functions . The sample has now been reduced to 26 consisting of only 
the Sajhas who perform credit as well as distribution functions. 
TABLE 5 . 4 
COMPARISON OF THE SAJHA PROGRAM WITH PRE- SAJHA SITUATION 
USING SIGN TEST n = 26 
Indicators n No. of No . of ~ h CR Ct. Level Observed Remarks 
+s 
- s n - ~ T-Values 
Area Coverage 20 nil 20 6 14 T:5 , T~15 . 05 nil Re j ect 
Household Coverage 22 18 4 7 15 6 or 16 . 05 18 Accept 
Membership 25 23 2 8 17 7 or 18 .05 23 Accept 
Share Capital 24 23 1 8 16 7 or 17 . 05 23 Accept 
Non-delinquent Loan 26 24 2 9 17 8 or 18 .05 24 Accept 
Delinquent Loan 26 18 8 9 17 8 or 18 . 05 18 Reject 
Interest Earned 26 22 4 9 17 8 or 18 .05 22 Accept 
Commission Earned 26 20 6 9 17 8 or 18 . 05 20 Accept 
Financial Turnover 26 21 5 9 17 8 or 18 .05 21 Accept 
Income 26 16 10 9 17 8 or 18 .05 1 6 Reject 
Expenditure 26 21 4 9 1 7 8 or 18 . 05 21 Accept 
Profit 25 13 12 9 16 8 or 18 . 05 13 Reject 
0' 
' _.J 
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study wishes to show that the mean number of activities of the post-Sajha 
period is greater than the pre - Sajha situation. 
The independent samples are classified and a test of mean 
difference has been conducted with the group means as the basis of com-
parlson . The results of this comparison of the mean of the number of 
activities are presented in Table 5.5 . The result obtained from the 
analysis supports the hypothesis mentioned in Section 1.3 that there has 
been an increase in the functioning of the Sajha Societies. 
of the t - values turned out as expected , l . e ., negative . 
The slgns 
But the 
question arlses , has this increase been significant from the pre - Sajha 
situation? The magnitude of the increase is significantly different for 
the variables area coverage , membership , share capital and non - delinquent 
loan at the 5% level. Si nce lending has increased , the interest earned 
by the Sajha has a l so increased significantly during the post- Sajha period . 
The sign fo r area coverage is positive indicating that there has been a 
sign~ficant decrease in area coverage. 
The activities of the post-Sajha situation have been compared 
with the pre-Sajha situation for the societies located in the Hills and 
the Plains separately to evaluate the regional variability. 
are presented in Tables 5 . 6 and 5 . 7 . 
The results 
The Sajhas located in the Plains differ significantly from the 
pre- Sajha situation only In area coverage , share capital and non-
delinquent loans at a 5% level of significance . The delinquency rate 
has also decreased in the societies in the Plains giving a positive slgn 
but the magnitude of this decrease is non - significant (Table 5 . 7). 
The societies located in the Hills differ from the pre-Sajha 
TABLE 5 . 5 
OMPARISON OF Till:: MEJ\N or TrrE NUMBER Of ACTIVITIES OF TIlE Sl\JlfA PROGRAM 
WITH '1'[1£ PRE-SAJIfl\ SITUATION USING A PI\IRED T-TEST 
DIFFERENCE-- -) L- 1-Indicutors N. CllS CS 
Std . Std . tailed tailed t-1Cdn Std . Dev. Srror Mean Std . Dev . Corr . Prob . t-va]ue Error 
._-
* ArcCl Covcr.l.Gc 25 B 11 . 8 2 . 3 . 465 2 . 32 2 . 479 0 . 496 0 . 114 0 . 586 2 . 34 
A 2 . 48 1 . 15 . 23~ 
Household CoveraGe 25 B 639 . 0 497 . 0 99 . 5 
-157 . 16286 . 64 57 . 33 0 . 828 0 . 000 -1 . 37 
l\ 796 . 0 477 . 0 95 . 0 
* fvlembc t ' ship 26 8 291 . 0 197 . 0 38 . 6 
-228 . 2 300 . 9 59 . 02 0 . 403 0 . 041 -1 . 935 
A 519.0 320 . 0 63 . 0 
* Share Capital 26 B 16.9 32 . 5 6 . 4 128 . 97 25 . 3 0 . 605 0 . 001 -2 . 235 
Rs . OOO A 132 . 4 146.0 28.-
-A- * Non-delinqucnt LOCln 26 B 69 . 9 86.8 17 . 0 55 . 8 10 . 9 0 . 837 0 . 000 -2 . 69 
Rs.OOO A 128 . 8 102.0 20 . 0 
Delinquent Loan 26 B 59 . 4 57 . 9 11 . 3 59 . 4 11 . 6 0 . 367 0 . 065 -0 . 56 
Rs . OOO A 72. 5 46 . 4 9 . 0 
Commis s ion 26 B 12 . 4 9 . 7 1 . 9 -4 . 2 7 . 2 1 . 4 0 . 773 0 . 000 -1 . 505 
Rs . OOO A 16 . 6 11 . 2 2 . ~ 
* Intercst: 26 B 13 . 6 11 . 3 2 . 2 -8 . 4 9 . 5 1 . 9 0 . 784 0 . 000 -2 . 24 
Rs . OOO A 22.0 15 . 4 3 . 0 
EXDcnditurc 26 B 13.8 8 . 9 1 . 7 -3 . 4 10 . 07 1.9 0 . 519 0 . 007 -0 . 87 
Rs.OOO A 17 . 3 11 . 2 2 . 2 
financial Turnover B 225 . 2 223 . 6 43 . 8 887.1 173 . 9 0 . 872 0 . 000 -0.635 
Rs.OOO A 445 . 9 1075.4 10 . -
Notes: * significant at the 5 per cent level. 
A = After the Program 
B = Before the Program 
N = 2b 
d . E . d . ~ . 
24 , 25 24 , 25 
d . E . t . 05 t . Ol 
24 1 . 711 2 . 492 
24 1 . 711 2 . 492 
25 1 . 708 2 . 485 
25 1 . 708 2 . 485 
25 1 . 708 2 . 485 
25 1 . 708 2.485 
25 1 . 708 2 . 485 
25 1 . 708 2 . 485 
25 1 . 708 2 . 485 
25 1 . 708 2.485 
R 
Sign 
EXDec 
+ 
+ 
pro~ . 
. 00] 
. 011 
. 001 
. 000 
. 000 
.272 
. 00 
. 000 
. 094 
. 21 
'-J 
o 
COMPARISON OF THE MEAN OF THE KUMBER OF ACTIVITIES OF THE SAJEz\ PROGRA}' 
IN THE HILLS WITH THE PRE-SAJHA SITUATION USING AT-TEST 
Indicators DIFFERENCE--7 2- 1 -
tailed Std . Std . tailed Mean Std . Dev . Mean Std . Dev . Corr. Prob e t - value d . f . Error Error 
Area Coverage B 4 . 0 1.3 0 . 422 1 . 0 1 . 05 0 . 333 0 . 746 0 . 013 +1 . 5 9 A 3 . 0 1 . 6 0 . 494 
* 9 Household Coverage B 708 . 0 556 . 0 176 . 0 - 265 . 5 210 . 4 66 .5 0 . 94 0 . 000 
- 1 . 995 A 9 73. 0 613.0 194.0 
Membership B 230 . 0 128 . 0 38 . 0 
- 201 . 1 281 . 6 84 . 9 0 . 299 0 . 371 
-1 . 185 10 A 431 . 0 292 . 0 88 . 0 
Share Capital Rs( 000) B 10 . 1 5 . 01 1 . 5 Large 49.05 14.8 0 . 52 0 . 101 
- 0 . 845 10 A 35.2 51 . 5 15 . 5 
* 
Non - delinquent Loan B 82 . 8 1 00 . 2 30 . 2 " 37 . 4 11 . 3 0 . 942 0 . 000 
-2. 30 10 Rs (000) A 134.7 110 . 9 33 .5 
Delinquent Loan Rs (000 ) B 33 . 01 25 . 8 7 . 7 " 48 . 6 14.6 0 . 694 0 . 018 
-1.325 10 A 71 . 9 62 . 8 18 . 9 Corrunission Rs (000 ) B 10. 8 8 . 3 2 .5 
- 6 .09 9 . 4 2 . 8 0 . 666 0.025 
-1. 0 7 1 0 A 16. 8 12 . 6 3.8 
* 
Interest Rs (000 ) B 12 . 8 12. 9 3 . 9 Large 7. 01 2 .1 0 . 968 0 . 000 
- 2 . 41 10 A 23 . 05 1 8 .7 5.6 
Expenditure Rs (000 ) B 11 . 05 3 . 6 1 . 08 
-2. 2 4 . 7 1.4 0 . 316 0 . 344 
-0.76 10 A 13 . 2 4 . 4 1.3 
Financial Turnover B 187 . 7 143 . 4 43 . 2 Large 68 . 6 20 . 7 0 . 914 0 . 000 
-1.31 5 1 0 Rs (000) A 242 . 0 167 . 5 50.5 
Notes : 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level . 
A = After the Program 
B = Before the Program 
1 1 or 
H~ Ii 
t . 05 t. Ol 
d . f . d . f . 
1 . 833 2 . 821 
1. 833 2 . 821 
1 . 81 2 2 . 764 
1. 81 2 2 . 764 
1 . 812 2 . 764 
1 . 81 2 2 . 764 
1 . 81 2 2 . 764 
1 . 812 2 . 764 
1 . 81 2 2 .764 
1 . 812 2 . 764 
T 
Rs 
Sign 
Expected 
+ 
+ 
row-
n = 11 
Prob . 
. 015 
. 003 
. 039 
. 121 
. 001 
. 024 
. 058 
. 001 
. 160 
'-J 
f-.J 
II! , 
TABLE 5.7 
COMPARISON OF THE MEAN OF THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES OF THE SAJHA PROGRAM 
IN THE PLAINS WITH THE PRE- SAJHA SITUATION USING AT - TEST 
n = 15 
Difference ~ 2 1 Indicators Mean Std . Dev . Std . Mean Std . Dev . Std . Corr . Tailed Tailed d . f . t . 05 t . 01 Expected Prob . Error Error Prob . T- Va1ue d . f . d . f . Sign 
* 
Area Coverage B 5 . 3 2.7 0 . 701 3 . 2 2 . 78 0 . 72 0 . 014 0 . 961 2 . 225 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 + 0 . 001 A 2 . 1 0 . 64 0 .1 65 
Household Coverage B 593 468 120 
- 84 . 9 313 81 0 . 743 0 . 001 - 0 . 525 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 0 . 312 A 678 334 86 
Membership B 335 229 59 
- 248 322 83 0 . 394 0 .146 -1.4 9 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 0 . 010 A 583 334 86~ 4 
** 
Share Capital B 21 . 8 42 . 5 10 . 9 High 129 . 7 33 . 5 0 . 638 0 . 01 0 - 2 .71 5 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 0.000 (000) A 203 . 8 152 . 6 39.4 
* 
Non-delinquent Loan B 60 . 6 77.7 20 . 0 High 67 . 04 17 . 3 0.736 0 . 002 -1 . 85 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 0 . 002 A 124.6 98 . 7 25.5 
Delinquent Loan B 78 . 7 67 . 5 17 . 4 58 . 3 60 . 9 15 . 7 0 . 433 0 . 107 +0 .185 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 + 0 . 716 A 72 . 9 31 . 9 8 . 2 
Conunission B 13 . 5 10 . 7 2 . 8 
- 2 . 9 4 . 9 1 . 3 0 . 892 0 . 000 - 1 .1 35 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 0 . 040 A 16 . 4 10.4 2 . 7 
Interest B 14 . 2 10.4 2 . 7 
-7 . 1 11 . 1 2.9 0 . 566 0 . 028 -1 . 235 14 1 . 761 2.624 0 . 027 A 21 . 3 13 . 02 3 . 4 
Expenditure B 15.9 11.1 2 . 8 
-4 . 4 12 . 7 3 . 3 0.485 0 . 067 - 0 . 665 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 0 . 205 A 20 . 3 13 . 7 3.5 
Financial Turnover B 252 . 7 269 . 7 69.6 High 1186 301.6 0.916 0.000 -0.57 14 1 . 761 2 . 624 0 . 000 A 595.5 1410.1 64 . 1 
Notes: B = Before the Program . 
A = After the Program. 
Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
--J * 
t\.) 
** Significant at the 1 per cent level . 
situation only in household coverage and non-delinquent loans at a 5% 
level of significance . The area coverage has decreased to some extent 
glv1ng a positive sign but it has non-significance. 
5 . 3 Comparison of the Activities Between the Sajhas 1n the Hills and 
the Plains 
The activities of the Sajha Societies in the Hills and the 
Plains have been compared by subtracting the performance of the pre-Sajha 
situation from the post-Sajha situation. The actual testing has been 
conducted by computing F - ratios as the basis for comparison. The 
analysis of variance for the group mean comparison has been carried out. 
The hypothesis proposed in Section 1 . 3 was that 'the societies in different 
regions differ in efficiency in different lines of activities due to : 
(i) uneven rate of growth ; and (ii) large and uneconomic infrastructure'. 
The results obtained are presented in Table 5.8 . 
The Sajhas in the Hills differ significantly from the societies 
in the Plains only in area coverage and share capital , at the 1 % level. 
It 1S obvious that the Sajhas in the Hills cover a larger area than the 
Sajhas 1n the Plains. The contribution to share capital of the Sajhas 
located in the Plains is much higher than the Hills because two-thirds of 
the potential cUltivated area of Nepal lies in the Plains. Other 
activities between these two societies of the region do not differ 
significantly . 
5 . 4 Re ayment and Deli nquenc y Arnons' Commi ttee 1em;)ers 
The total loans outstanding to members of the advisory committee 
are classified as delinquent and non -delinquent . The members have been 
grouped into three different groups according to their farm sizes of 
TABLE 5 . 8 
COMPARISON OF GROUP MEANS BETWEEN SOCIETIES IN THE HILLS AND THE PLAINS 
USING ONE WAY ANOVA 
Computed Tabulated 
Indicators Source d . f . SS 
Area Coverage Bet . Groups 1 33.306 
Within " 24 119.309 
Household Coverage Bet. " 1 Larg e 
Within " 24 " 
Membership Bet. " 1 " 
Within " 24 " 
Share Capital (000 ) Bet . " 1 " 
Within II 24 " 
Non-delinquent Loan Bet . II 1 " 
Within " 24 . " 
Delinquent Loan Bet . " 1 " 
Within " 24 " 
Interest Earned Bet . " 1 " 
Within " 24 " 
Interest Paid Bet. " 1 " 
Within " 24 " 
Commission Bet. " 1 II 
Within II 24 " 
Financial Turnover Bet. " 1 II 
Within " 24 " 
Expenditure Bet . II 1 " 
Within " 24 II 
Note: * significant at the 5 per cent level. 
** significant at the 1 per cent level . 
MS 
2 F R F1,24 F1 , 24 
(.05 ) (.01) 
* 33.306 6.7 0 . 22 4 . 26 7.82 
4.97 
Large 2.025 0 . 0778 
" 
" 0 .149 0 .7029 
" 
** 
" 14.448 0.3758 
" 
" 0.287 0.0118 
" 
" 4.029 0.1438 
" 
" 0 . 890 0 . 0358 
" 
" 1.539 0 . 0602 
" 
" 1.243 0 . 0492 
" 
" 0.662 0.0268 
" 
" 0 . 297 0 . 0122 
" 
-l 
r 
--
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holding as 0-4 Bighas, 4 -1 0 Bighas and above 1 0 ' Bighas to define smal l, 
medium and large farmers. The total number of members recorded is 90. 
The percentage of d e linquent loans for the se three different sizes of 
holding is 2 . 8% , 28 .1 % and 69 .1 % respectively . For the whole of Nepal, 
the percentage of farmers in these three groups are 83 . 0%, 12.9% and 4.1% 
respe c tively . (See footnote 2, page 79-80 . ) 
Hypothesis four proposed that ' the dominance of larger farmers 
In the advisory committee has benefited them more than the small and 
medium farmers '. The results are presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.1 0 . 
Since the higher percentage of loans are on larger sizes of holding so 
the larger farmers have benefited more from the Sajha credit than small 
and medium farmers . 
The fifth hypothesis lS that ' default rates are higher among the 
dominant groups than the small and medium farmers '. The Chi-square test 
has been conducted to examine the significant difference between these 
groups. The results of the test are presented in Table 5.11-5.13. 2 The X 
values at the 5% l evel are 5.16, 11.01 and 8 . 77 for the farmers, small, 
medium and large respectively and the tabulated value for X2 is 5.99 . 
The analysis reveals that delinquency among small sizes of holding 
is insignificant while d e linquency among the remaining two groups lS 
statistically significant and is higher . 1 The detail s of distribution, 
repayment and delinquency of loan among different sizes of farm holding 
are dealt with in Chapter 6 . 
1 2 The X value for the small farmers representative in the advi sory 
committee for d e linq u ency of loan is 5.16 < 5 . 99 at the 5% l eve l of 
significance which indicates that the delinquency of loan and dis-
tribution of loan among these groups is statistically insignificant. 
TABLE 5 . 9 
2 DELINQUENCY RATE AMONG THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE USING X TEST 
Size of Holdings 
Performance 
0 - 4 Bighas 5-10 . Above Blghas 10 Bighas Total 
Frequency 25 29 36 90 
Percentage 28 32 40 100 
Obs. Delinquent Loan Oi Rs 3900 38650 95100 137650 
Expected Del . Loan Ei 1 4922 39479 83249 
Obs. Non - del . Loan Oi 23050 32650 55250 110950 
Expected " " Ei 12028 31821 67101 
Total 26950 71300 150350 248600 
TABLE 5 . 10 
PERCENTAGE OF LOAN DISTRIBUTION 
0 - 4 Bighas 5- 10 B ' Above 19has 10 . h Blg as Total 
Obs . Delinquent Loan Oi 2 . 8 28 . 1 69 . 1 100 
Expected Del . Loan Ei 11 . 7 28 . 8 59 . 5 
Obs . Non-del . Loan Oi 20 . 7 29 . 5 49 . 8 100 
Expected " " Ei 11 . 8 28 . 8 59 . 4 
Total 23 . 5 57 . 6 118 . 9 200 
2 L(Oi-Ei)2 ** X = = 16 . 63 
Ei 
2 2 CR X > X 2 (05) ~ 5 . 99 
ote : Obs . = Observed 
Del . = Delinquent 
** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
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TABLE 5.11 
DELINQUENCY RATE WITHIN THE SMALL GROUPS 
Performance 
Delinquent Loan 
Non-delinquent 
Loan 
Total 
2 
Size of Holding 
0-2 Bighas 2-4 Bighas 
2500 
5550 
5800 
3650 
17500 
21150 
Notes : X Value = 5 . 16 
Non-significant, l.e ., 5 . 16 < 5 . 99 
Reject 
TABLE 5 . 12 
SMALL VIS MEDIUM FARMERS 
Size of Holding 
0 - 4 Bighas 
5-10 Bighas 
Total 
DL 
3900 
38650 
42550 
2 Notes : X = 11 . 01 > 5 . 99 
Accept 
Performance 
NDL 
23050 
32650 
55700 
DL = Delinquent Loan 
NDL = Non-delinquent Loan 
Total 
3900 
23050 
26950 
Total 
26950 
71300 
98250 
77 
TABLE 5.11 
DELINQUENCY RATE WITHIN THE SMALL GROUPS 
Performance 
Delinquent Loan 
Non-delinquent 
Loan 
Total 
2 
Size of Holding 
0 - 2 Bighas 2-4 Bighas 
2500 
5550 
5800 
3650 
17500 
21150 
Notes: X Value = 5.16 
Non-significant, l.e ., 5 .16 < 5 . 99 
Reject 
TABLE 5 .1 2 
SMALL VIS MEDIUM FARMERS 
Size of Holding 
0 -4 Bighas 
5-10 Bighas 
Total 
DL 
3900 
38650 
42550 
2 
Notes : X = 11 . 01 > 5 . 99 
Accept 
Performance 
NDL 
23050 
32650 
55700 
DL = Delinquent Loan 
NDL = Non-delinquent Loan 
Total 
3900 
23050 
26950 
Total 
26950 
71300 
98250 
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TABLE 5.13 
SMALL AND MEDIUM VIS LARGER FARMERS 
Size of Holding 
0-10 Bighas 
Above 10 Bighas 
DL 
42550 
95100 
Total 137650 
2 
Notes: X = 8 . 7748 > 5 . 99 
Accept 
DL = Delinquent Loan 
Performance 
NDL 
55700 
55250 
110950 
NDL = Non-delinquent Loan 
5 . 5 Summary 
Total 
98250 
150350 
248600 
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The introduction of the Sajha Program has resulted in the reduction 
of area coverage . Due to the transfer of compulsory savings into the share 
capital of the Sajhas, the amount of share capital and membership has 
increased significantly in both the reglons . The loan per member has 
not increased with the introduction of the Sajha Program and default 
rates per member have decreased slightly. All the Sajhas are operating 
at the break- even point when the performance between two periods is 
compared . 
Sajhas located in the Hills do not differ from Sajhas in the 
Plains in performing activities except area coverage and amount of share 
capital . The Sajhas in the Hills are equally as efficient as in the 
Plains In all operations. 
The proportion of larger farmers in the advisory committee is 
higher and the proportion of loans to them and default rates is also higher 
among the larger farmers . 
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CHAPTER 6 
SAJHA CREDIT AND THE SMALL FARMERS 
In this chapter the effectiveness of the Sajha Program as an 
instrument for supplying credit and input servi ces to the farmers, par-
ticularly small farmers, is examined . The activities of the Sajha 
Societies (operational functioning) like the distribution of loan among 
the farmers with different sizes of farm holding , the credit needs of 
these size groups , the repayment of loans and the delinquency of loans 
on these sizes of holding are examined. 
6 . 1 Farm Size and the Distribution of Loan 
In the present sample of 20 Sajha Societies l (10 each representing 
the Hills and the Plains ) , the total area of land owned by each farmer is 
taken as a proxy for his resource endowments to define larger and smaller 
farmers . The records of borrowing from the Sajha Societies for current 
production and investment loans by members with different sizes of holding 
are examined. The farm sizes are classified2 as 0-2 Bigha$, 2-4 Bigh~s 
1 The total number of sample soci eti~s under study is 30, including four 
district unions, but the information under examination is available 
only for 20 societies for lending, repayments and delinquency of loan. 
The reason for incomplete information is that some of the Sajhas have 
been organized recently after the introduction of the Sajha Program, 
so details of records were not available during the survey. 
2 The average farm holdings and distribution are as follows: * 
Size Household % Area In % 
0 - 1 ha 53.5 10 . 5 
1 - 3 ha 29 . 5 18.0 
3 - 5 ha 7.1 12.0 
5 
-10 ha 5 . 8 21. 0 
Above 10 ha 4.1 38.5 
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Above 10 ha 4.1 38.5 
* 
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4-10 Bighas and above 10 Bighas, t o define marginal, small, med ium and 
larger farmers. The amount of loan on these sizes of farm holding are 
taken as a proxy for the distribution of loan. The repayment of loan 
from all sizes of farm holding and non-repayment In due time of maturity 
are taken as proxy for active participation and the default of the Sajha 
credit . 
Usually larger farmers borrow a larger amount of loan from the 
Sajha and they are expected to repay a larger amount than the smaller 
farmers. Repayment of loan refers to paylng back the borrowed loan with 
interest to the Sajha within the committed period by the member farmers. 
If the borrowers fail to repay the loan in due time, either the full or 
a partial amount, they are considered as delinquent. 
6.1.1 Distribution of Loan on Different Sizes of Holding 
The target groups (HMG, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Irrigation 1976) in the Sajha Program are the lowest two groups 
2 (Continued) 
Average Size of Holdings by Region 1971 * 
Regions Cultivated Land Population Household Per Capita Land 
Hills 706,000 ha 7,210,000 1,295,000 0 .185 
(35.22 %) (62.3%) 
Plains 1,293,000 ha 4,346 , 000 794,000 0 . 297 
(64.78%) (37.61%) 0.173 
The Agricultural Credit Survey of Nepal conducted by the Rastra Bank 
in 1972 classified the size of holdings into 3 groups on the basis of 
listing the actual sizes of holding of all sizes of farmer into a 
frequency distribution of 0-4 Bigha, 4-8 Bigha and above 8 Bigha to 
define small , medium and larger farmers . 
The Agricultural Development Bank during the survey of this study 
classified farmers into six groups as landless, 0-1 Bigha, 1-2 Bigha, 
2-4 Big ha , 4 -1 0 Bigha and above 1 0 Bigha . The Sajha Program 
considers the farmers below 4 Bigha as small farmers . In this study 
farm sizes are classified into 4 as 0 - 2 Bigha, 2 - 4 Bigha , 4-1 0 
Bigha and above 10 Bigha. 
Source: HMG , Ministry of Food , Agriculture and Irrigation 1972 and 1977, 
Agricultural Statistics of epal . 
* 
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2 (Continued) 
Average Size of Holdings by Region 1971 * 
Regions Cultivated Land Population Household Per Capita Land 
Hills 706,000 ha 7,210 , 000 1 , 295,000 0.185 
(35 . 22 %) (62 . 3%) 
Plains 1,293,000 ha 4,346 , 000 794,000 0.297 
(64 . 78%) (37 . 61%) 0.173 
The Agricultural Credit Survey of Nepal conducted by the Rastra Bank 
in 1972 classified the size of holdings into 3 groups on the basis of 
listing the actual sizes of holding of all sizes of farmer into a 
frequency distribution of 0-4 Bigha, 4-8 Bigha and above 8 Bigha to 
define small, medium and larger farmers . 
The Agricultural Development Bank during the survey of this study 
classified farmers into six groups as landless, 0-1 Bigha, 1-2 Bigha, 
2-4 Bigha, 4-10 Bigha and above 10 Bigha . The Sajha Program 
considers the farmers below 4 Bigha as small farmers. In this study 
farm sizes are classified into 4 as 0-2 Bigha, 2-4 Bigha, 4-10 
Bigha and above 10 Bigha. 
Source : HMG , Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Irrigation 1972 and 1977, 
Agricultural Statistics of Nepal . 
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of farmers who own less than four Bighas of land as defined in the ob-
jectives of the Sajha Program. Larger benefits to them should be treated 
as the success of the Sajha Program in distributing the loans. 
The average distribution of loan among these different Slzes of 
farm holding is presented in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1. 
The average borrowings by these different groups for current 
production plus investment loan are Rs 1,661, Rs 2,184, Rs 5,867 and 
Rs 8,204 for the farm sizes 0-2 Bighas,2-4 Bighas,4-l0 Bigh~and above 
10 Bighas respectively. The production loan in all size groups comprises 
a smaller proportion than the investment loans . The analysis reveals 
that as the size of holding increases the average borrowings and the 
variation within the group increases. The coefficients of variation 
among the smaller size of holding are smaller with the exception of the 
farm size holding above 10 Bighas. The farmers with the asset of holding 
between four to ten Bighas of land obtained the highest amount of loans. 
6 .1. 2 Credit Needs and Farm Size 
1 The Agricultural Credit Survey conducted by the Nepal Rastra Bank 
In 1972 reveals that the average per unit area of credit needs lS found to 
be decreasing with the increase In size of farm In both reglons. The per 
Bigha credit needs of all Slzes of farm holding are higher in the Hills 
than In the Plains. The credit needs of the smaller size farms are more 
than the needs of the medium and large size of farm holdings due to the 
1 Rastra Bank , 1972, Vol . I . The credit 
for large, medium and small farmers are 
for the Hills and Rs 393, Rs 553 and Rs 
needs at improved technology 
Rs 638, Rs 1,400, and Rs 1 , 431 
617 for the Plains . The costs 
include seed bed preparation, land preparation, sowing, uprooting, 
transplanting , hoeing, weeding, seed, organic manures, chemical 
fertilizers , irrigation, plant protection, harvesting, threshing, 
storing , drying and rettings (for Jute) and an interest rate of 14% 
per annum . 
TABLE 6 . 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOAN AMONG DIFFERENT SIZES OF HOLDING 
(PER BORROWER) 
n = 20 Rs 
Size of Holding 0-2 Bigha 2- 4 Bigha 4 - 10 Bigha Above 10 Bigha Total Loan/ 
Borrower/Soc iety Coeff . - Coeff . - Coeff . Coeff . - Coeff . Per Borrower M 0- M 0- M 0- M 0- M 0-Var . Var . Var . Var. Var . 
Current Production 505 361 71 . 4 433 297 68 . 6 1159 3866 233 . 0 1405 1523 108 3333 4340 130 
Investment 1156 588 50 . 8 1751 1377 78 . 6 4708 4798 102 . 0 6799 5933 87 . 3 6459 6537 101 
Total 1 661 949 57 . 1 2184 1674 76 . 6 5867 8664 147 . 6 8204 6086 74 . 2 9792 8196 83 . 7 
HILLS n = 10 
Current Production 418 264 63 . 1 363 210 57.8 488 242 49 . 6 633 556 87.8 1590 745 46 . 8 
Investment 871 687 78 . 9 1388 1111 80 .0 4041 3642 90.1 8121 6504 80 . 1 7066 7348 104 . 0 
Total 12 89 951 73 . 7 1751 1321 75 . 4 4529 3884 85 . 7 8754 8677 99.1 8656 7641 88.3 
PLAINS n = 1 0 
Current Production 569 418 73 . 5 491 353 72 . 0 2511 4997 199 . 0 2177 1834 84 . 2 4758 5512 115 . 8 
Investment 1 2 79 551 43.0 2024 1562 77.2 5374 5964 111 . 0 2833 5963 6114 102.5 
Total 1848 969 52 . 4 2515 1915 76.1 7885 10961 139.0 5010 8656 7641 88.3 
-Notes: M = Mean 
0- = Standard Deviation 
Coeff.Var. = Coefficient of Variation 
Rs = Nepalese Rupees 
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fact that large farm size holdings have a higher income. As a result 
these large farmers generate sufficient funds from their own income to 
purchase inputs and to meet other operational expenses and therefore do 
not need much credit, while smaller farmers cannot even meet their con-
sumption expenses from their production and have to depend solely on 
borrowed funds to execute the best farm plans . 
Loans from the Sajha for current production are advanced on the 
basis of production needs and the productivity of additional investment. 
The maximum credit limit is fixed on the basis of the repaying capacity 
1 
of the borrowers. 
The amount of loan per member is compared between the Hills and 
the Plains: the average borrowing is higher in the Plains than in the 
Hills. But the needs of credit per borrower among different sizes of 
farm holdings in the Hills are also higher than in the Plains , because 
resource endowments and soil productivity are higher in the Plains. 
The investment loan comprises a larger proportion than current 
production . The current production loans are disbursed in kind and in 
1 Rastra Bank 1972, Vol . I, p . l08. 
different sizes of farm holding 
out as follows: 
Size of Region Total 
Holding Income 
Large Hills 8262 
Medium " 4556 
Small " 2534 
Large Plains 17200 
Medium " 7647 
Small " 3643 
Repaying capacity is the portion 
The repaying capacity of three 
for both the regions has been worked 
Living Annual Total Rep. 
Exp . Fixed Exp. Exp. Capacity 
3134 498 3632 4630 
2125 262 2387 2169 
1461 109 1570 964 
5376 173 0 7106 10094 
3571 769 4340 3307 
2369 338 2707 936 
amount of lncome from total annual 
84 
income of a farm family which is available for repayment of loan after 
meeting living and fixed annual expenses . 
Repaying Capacity = Total Income - (living expenses + fixed annual 
e xpenses of t he year) 
8 5 
cash , while the investment loans involve cash only due to lack of 
suppliers . The borrowers are supposed to find themselves the improved 
breeds of livestock , bullocks, etc. with the exception of farm machinery. 
Although the investment loan is financed in instalments, after submitting 
the evidence of purchase, the final instalment is given to them. The 
higher proportion of investment loan supports the fact that the borrowing 
members are more interested in loans in cash rather than in kind and they 
can divert them to other purposes instead of investing in the purpose 
specified, although cooperative law binds them to invest for a specific 
purpose . 
6.1.3 Distribution of Loan Per Unit Area 
The amounts of loan per unit area for different Slzes of farm 
holding are presented in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2. 
The distribution of loan per unit area (Bigha) for different 
Slzes of farm holding is Rsl,661, Rs 553 , Rs 696 and Rs 221 per borrower 
respectively. The absolute amounts of loan to the larger size of holding 
is higher , but the relative amount of loan per unit area per borrower is 
higher among the smaller size of farm holding due to the fact that gross 
farm income is higher among the larger size of farm holding so these 
farmers can save for future investment, and credit needs per unit area 
becomes less. Gross farm income among the smaller size of farm holding 
is low and the farmers cannot save for future investment and need a higher 
amount of credit per unit area . The coefficients of variation among the 
larger Slze of farm holding are higher than the coefficient of variation 
among small farmers. The proportion of investment loans are higher for 
current production for all sizes of farm holding in both regions . 
TABLE 6 . 2 
PER BIGHA DISTRIBUTION OF LOAN AMONG DIFFERENT SIZES OF HOLDING 
n=20 Rs 
Size of Holding 0- 2 Bigha 2- 4 Bigha 4 - 10 Bigha Above 10 Bigha 
Coeff . - Coeff . - Coeff . - Coeff . M a M a M a M a Var . Var . Var . Var . 
Current Production 505 361 71 . 4 144 99 . 1 68 . 8 225 540 240 . 0 84 . 3 135 . 1 161 
Investment 1156 588 50 . 8 409 468 114 . 0 471 649 138 . 0 136 . 0 365 268 
Total 1661 949 51 . 3 553 567 1 02 . 5 696 1189 170 . 8 221 . 0 500 226 . 2 
HILLS n = 10 
Current Product ion 418 264 63 . 1 309 57.8 60 . 0 40 64 . 5 142 . 0 54 . 0 1 28 . 5 237.9 
Investment 871 687 78. 9 430 373 120 . 7 449 518 115 . 4 271.0 520 191 . 8 
Total 1289 9 51 73 . 7 739 430 . 8 58 . 3 489 582 . 5 119 . 1 325 . 0 648 . 5 199 . 9 
PLAINS n = 10 
Current Production 569 418 73 . 5 164 1 1 8 71 . 9 359 714 199 . 0 119 . 0 172 144.5 
Investment 1279 551 43 . 0 491 538 109 . 6 489 765 156.4 26 . 0 85 326 
Total 1848 969 52 . 4 655 609 92.9 848 1479 174 . 4 145.0 198 136.5 
-Notes: M = Mean 
a = Standard Deviation 
Coeff . Var . = Coefficient of Variation 
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The average borrowings are higher in the Plains than in the Hills. 
* 
The coefficients of variation are higher among the larger farmers in both 
reglons. 
Farm Size 
Group 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LOAN AND 
* DELINQUENCY AMONG DIFFERENT SIZES 
Plains Hills 
Loan Del. Loan Del . 
44.7 42 37 . 2 49.8 
27 .7 30 35.3 32.5 
27 .6 28 27.5 17.7 
Sizes of member farmers In the sample . 
6.1.4 Repayment of Loans and Farm Size 
Total 
Loan Del. 
48 . 8 45.7 
30.6 31.3 
27 .6 23 
Timely repayment lS an important indicator of the active par-
ticipation of the farmers In the Sajha Program resulting in a higher 
turnover of transaction. The repayment records for different Slzes of 
farm holding are tabulated in Table 6.3 and in Figure 6.3 . 
The average repayment per borrower among different Slzes of farm 
holding in the sample are Rs 1,556, Rs 1,919, Rs 2,244 and Rs 2,855 
respectively. 
From Table 6.4 we find that the repayment of loans and the 
delinquency of loans are higher than borrowings; this lS because the 
borrowing (for current production) lS the figure for the current year 
while the repayment and delinquency includes the dues of prevlous years. 
TABLE 6 .3 
REPAYMENT OF LOANS BY DIFFERENT SIZES OF HOLDING 
n = 20 
Rs 
0- 2 Bigha 2- 4 Bigha 4-10 Bigha Above 10 Bigha Total Repaid/ Per Borrower Borrower/Society 
- Coeff . - Coeff . Coeff . - Coeff . - Coeff . M 0" M 0" M 0" M 0" M 0" Var . Var . Var . Var . Var . 
Current Production 735 542 73.7 1137 989 86 . 9 1243 945 76.0 175 2 1 229 70 . 1 3979 2718 68 . 3 
Investment 821 281 34 . 2 782 497 63.5 1 005 713 70 . 9 1103 746 67 . 6 2056 1677 81 . 5 
Total 1556 823 52 . 8 1 919 1486 77.4 2248 1658 73.7 2855 1975 69 . 2 6035 3877 49 . 9 
HILLS n = 10 
Current Production 920 731 79 . 5 1455 1303 89.5 1466 1234 84 . 2 1983 1806 91 . 1 4593 3409 74 . 2 
Investment 836 344 41.1 822 561 68. 2 1105 821 74.3 1322 824 62 . 3 2906 1670 57 . 4 
Total 1756 1 075 61 . 2 2277 1 864 81. 8 2571 2055 79. 9 3305 2629 79 . 5 7499 465 0 62 . 0 
PLAINS n = 10 
Current Production 569 219 38 . 5 820 379 46.2 1042 582 33 . 0 1559 561 36.0 3366 1770 52 . 6 
Investment 793 136 17.1 709 406 57.3 803 46 0 44 .1 667 422 63 . 2 1206 124 2 103 
Total 1362 355 26 .1 1529 785 51.3 1 845 108 2 56.4 2226 983 44.1 4571 2313 50 . 6 
-Notes : M = Mean 
0" = Standard Deviation 
Coeff.Var. = Coefficient of Variation 
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TABLE 6 . 4 
REPAYMENT OF PRODUCTION LOANS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF 
HOLDING (PER BORROWER) IN SAMPLE SOCIETY 
Activity 
Borrowing 
Repayment 
Delinquency 
HILLS 
Borrowing 
Repayment 
Delinquency 
PLAINS 
Borrowing 
Repayment 
Delinquency 
Activity 
Borrowing 
Repayment 
Delinquency 
HILLS 
Borrowing 
Repayment 
Delinquency 
PLAINS 
Borrowing 
Repayment 
Delinquency 
0-2 Bigha 2-4 Bigha 4-10 Bigha 
505 433 1159 
735 1137 1243 
853 11 81 1781 
418 363 488 
920 1455 1466 
816 1255 1723 
569 491 2511 
569 820 1042 
886 11 06 2840 
TABLE 6 . 5 
REPAYMENT OF INVESTMENT LOANS ACCORDING 
TO SIZE OF HOLDING IN SAMPLE SOCIETY 
0-2 Bigha 2-4 Bigha 4 - 10 Bigha 
1156 1751 470 8 
82 1 782 1005 
63 1 1245 2280 
87 1 1388 4 041 
836 822 11 05 
482 9 77 1758 
1 279 2024 5374 
793 709 803 
781 1557 2907 
Above 10 
Bigha 
1405 
1752 
2330 
633 
1983 
2026 
2177 
1559 
2677 
Above 10 
Bigha 
6799 
1103 
1718 
81 21 
13 22 
1018 
2833 
667 
2418 
9 1 
92 
The proportion of repayments from current production is higher 
than the investment loans (Table 6.3). Except for the category 0-2 
Bighas , the amount repaid by the larger farmers is higher than the smaller 
farmers - it is obvious that the larger farmers also have borrowed larger 
amounts than the smaller ones . Repayments for different sizes of farm 
holding in the Hills are Rs 1 , 756, Rs 2 , 277 , Rs 2,571 and Rs 3 , 305 and 
in the Pl ains are Rs 1 , 362 , Rs 1 , 529, Rs 1 , 845 and Rs 2,226 respectively 
(Table 6 . 3 ) . 
Regional variation in repayment exists, but except for the Slze 
of holding 0-2 Bighas In the Plains , the proportion of repayments from 
current production is higher than the investment loan and the amount 
repaid is higher from the larger farmers . The records are better in the 
Hills as compared to the Plains indicating farmers in the Hills are more 
aware of cooperative principles and participate more actively than in the 
Plains ; however , average borrowings in the Pl ains are higher . 
The repayment records for current production are lower among the 
smaller sizes of farm holding than the larger one . The coefficients of 
variation are still higher within the larger Slze of farm holding. 
6 . 1.5 Non-Repayment and the Farm Size 
Delinquency of loan is the main problem of Sajha credit among all 
slzes of farm holding. Delinquency refers to the non-repayment of 
borrowed loan , of either the full or a partial amount to the Sajha at the 
time when it is due . The non-repayment of loan is reported for all sizes 
of farm holding In Table 6 . 6 and Figure 6.4. 
The average delinquency per borrower among different sizes of 
farm holding is Rs 1,484 , Rs 2,426, Rs 4 , 061 and Rs 4,048 respectively. 
The proportion of non-repayment from current production is higher than 
from investment loans for the sizes of farm ho lding 0 -2 and above 10 
TABLE 6 . 6 
DELINQUENCY OF LOANS AMONG DIFFERENT SIZES OF HOLDING 
n = 20 
0 - 2 Bigha 2 - 4 Bigha 4-10 Bigha Above 10 Bigha 
Coeff . - Coeff. - Coeff. - Coeff . 
M a M a M a M a Var . Var. Var . Var. 
Current Production 853 453 53 .1 1181 734 62.1 1781 839 47.1 2330 1284 55 . 1 
Investment 631 337 53 . 4 1245 899 72.2 2280 1188 52 .1 1718 1023 59.5 
Total 1484 790 53 . 2 2426 1633 67.3 4061 202 7 49 . 9 4048 2307 56 . 9 
HILLS n = 10 
Current Production 816 502 61 . 5 1255 966 78.5 1723 1082 62 . 8 2026 1211 59 . 7 
Investment 482 311 64 . 5 977 291 29 .7 1758 722 41 . 0 1018 388 38.1 
Total 12 98 813 62 . 6 2232 1277 57.2 3481 1804 51 . 8 3034 1599 52 . 7 
PLAINS n = 10 
Current Production 886 428 48.3 1106 390 35.2 2840 555 30.1 2677 1369 51 .1 
Investment 781 321 41.1 1557 1273 81 .7 2907 1407 48 . 4 2418 1015 41 . 9 
Total 1667 749 44.9 2663 1663 62.4 5747 1962 41 . 3 5095 2384 46.8 
-
Notes: M = Mean 
a = Standard Deviation 
Coeff.Var. = Coefficient of variation 
Rs 
Total Deliq . / 
Borrower/Society 
- Coeff . M a Var. 
5519 2758 49 . 9 
2722 3169 116 . 4 
8242 4741 57 . 5 
5333 3517 65 . 9 
2183 1914 87.7 
7516 4756 63 . 3 
5705 1903 33.3 
3262 4109 126.0 
8767 4864 54.2 
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Bighas . The middle two groups have a higher delinquency in investment 
loans . The amount of delinquency increases as the size of holding in-
creases . The coefficient of variation is also higher the larger the 
size of farm holding . 
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The average delinquency per borrower in the Hills is Rs 1,298 , 
Rs 2 , 232 , Rs 3 , 481 and Rs 3 , 034 and in the Plains is Rs 1 , 667, Rs 2 , 663, 
Rs 5 , 747 and Rs 5 , 095 respectively for the four different sizes of farm 
holding . The non - repayment rates are higher in the Plains than in the 
Hil l s for all size groups . The delinquency for current production lS 
higher than for investment and this lS true in both the reglons ; the 
farmers with larger holdings have a higher delinquency on investment loans. 
(See Tables 6.4 to 6 . 6) . On average farmers having holdings of 2-10 
Bighas have a higher delinquency for investment loans . Delinquency is 
higher for production loans in the Hills , while in the Plains the middle 
two groups have a higher delinquency for investment loans than for current 
production . 
Looking at the per unit area delinquency the lower two groups 
have the highest and the upper two groups have the lowest amount. The 
amounts of delinquency per Bigha is reported in Table 6 . 7 and Figure 6.5 . 
From the table we find that the delinquency per unit area decreases as 
the s i ze of holding increases . The average delinquency per unit area lS 
Rs 1 , 484 , Rs 809 , Rs 581 and Rs 405 respectively; the figures for the 
Hills are Rs 1 , 298, Rs 744, Rs 497 and Rs 305 and for the Plains are 
Rs 1 , 667 , Rs 888 , Rs 821 and Rs 510 respectively for the four different 
sizes of farm holding. The highest delinquency lies among the farm Slze 
groups between 0- 2 and the delinquency rate is higher in the Plains than 
in the Hills . This could be because the smaller farmers are assumed to 
consume most of their produce for family consumption and hence are unable to 
repay the loans : the economic implication could be that it is necessary to 
provide them with consumption loans and charge them at a lower interest on 
production credit and also give them a s izeable subsidy on material inputs. 
TABLE 6 . 7 
PER BIGHA DELINQUENCY OF LOAN AMONG DIFFERENT SIZES OF HOLDING 1 
n = 20 
0- 2 Bigha 2- 4 Bigha 4-10 Bigha Above 10 Bigha 
Coeff . - Coeff . - Coeff . - Coeff . M 0" M 0" M 0" M 0" Var . Var . Var . Var . 
Current Production 853 453 53 . 1 394 225 62 .1 255 120 47 . 1 233 1 28 55 . 1 
Investment 631 337 53 . 4 415 300 72.2 326 170 52 .1 172 102 59 . 5 
Total 1484 790 53 . 2 809 545 68 .1 581 290 49 . 9 405 230 56 . 8 
HILLS n = 10 
Current Production 816 502 61.5 418 329 78.5 246 155 62 . 8 203 121 59.7 
Investment 482 311 64.5 326 97 29.7 251 1 03 41 . 0 102 39 38 . 1 
Total 1298 813 62 . 6 744 426 57.2 497 258 51 . 9 305 160 52 . 4 
PLAINS n = 10 
Current Production 886 42 8 48 . 3 369 130 35 . 2 406 185 19 . 5 268 137 51 . 1 
Investment 781 321 41.1 519 428 81 .7 415 469 48.4 242 102 41 . 9 
Total 1667 749 44. 9 888 558 62 . 8 821 654 34.1 510 239 46.8 
Note : 1 The per unit area distribution and delinquency of loan has been worked out by dividing the 
amount of loan in each category by the mid point of each farm size. 
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The coefficients of variation are greater In the larger Slze 
groups. 
6 . 2 Summary 
As mentioned earlier the Sajha Program was introduced for the 
benefit of the small and medium farmers . Although the proportion of 
large, medium and small farmers in Nepal is 9 . 9% , 36 . 6 % and 53.5 % 
respectively (See p .7 9 , Footnote 2) , from the analyses it is found 
that 41 . 8 % of the total disbursement of loan has been distributed to 
larger farmers, 30.6% to the medium and 27.6% to the small farmers 
(Figure 6.6) . The larger proportion of the benefit of loans goes to 
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the larger size of holdings. This is true in both the regions (the Hills 
and the Plains) . The percentage distribution of loans among small, 
medium and larger farmers in the Hills and in the Plains are 27.5, 35.3 
and 37 . 2, and 27 . 6, 27.7 and 44.7 respectively (Figures 6 .7 and 6.8). 
The non-repayment of loans is higher as the size of holding 
increases and is highest among the larger groups. The non-repayment 
distribution is 23, 31 .3, 45.7 percent among small, medium and larger 
farmers (Table 6 . 9 and Figures 6.9 - 6 .11). The percentage of delinquency 
in terms of total loan In the Hills is 17.7, 32.5 and 49.8 (Figure 6.10) 
and in the Plains is 28 , 30 and 42 among the three categories of farmers 
(Figure 6 . 11). 
The small and marginal farmers have not received more credit 
from the Sajhas as expected . The larger farmers have received a higher 
proportion of credit and they seem more reluctant to repay the loans in 
time as shown by the higher percentage of delinquency upon them. This may 
be because the small farmers are a s sumed to spend most of their produce for 
family consumption and hence are unable to repay loans . 
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TABLE 6 . 8 
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF LOAN AMONG DIFFERENT SIZES 
OF FARM HOLDINGS, 1978 
SIZES OF FARM HOLDINGS 
0 - 2 Bigha 
416661 
59059 
475720 
27 . 5 
669764 
87177 
756941 
27.6 
1232661 
27.6 
2 - 4 Bigha 
450166 
160015 
610181 
35.3 
595277 
163974 
75 9251 
27 .7 
1369432 
30 . 6 
4 -10 Bigha Above 10 Bigha 
291185 101964 
187898 62947 
479083 164911 
27.7 9 . 5 
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37.2 
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44.7 
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SF Small Farmer Rs 756941 27 . 6% 
MF Medium Farmer Rs 759251 27.7% 
LF Large Farmer Rs 1224919= 44 . 7% 
Purpose 
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TABLE 6 . 9 
PER CENT DELINQUENCY OF LOAN AMONG DIFFERENT SIZES 
OF HOLDINGS BY REGION IN THE SAMPLE SAJHA SOCIETIES, 1978 
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PER CENT DELINQUENCY OF LOAN AMONG DIFFERENT 
SIZES OF FARM HOLDINGS IN THE PLAINS, 
1978 
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LF Large Farmer Rs 379961 42% 
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CHAPTER 7 
WORKING OF THE SAJHA PROGRAM: SOME OPINIONS 
As a part of the study of the working of the Sajha Program, some 
oplnlons about the Program were sought during data collection through 
interviews with different member farmers , non-borrowers and the co-
operative managers. An analysis of the opinions is presented in this ' 
chapter . 
7.1 Working of the Sajha Program: Opinions on Operational Procedures 
The operational procedures of the Sajhas and their social and 
economlc impact among the rural masses have been examined. As a process 
of examination a series of questions were asked of the borrower-cum-member-
farmers, non-borrowers and the Sajha (cooperative) managers on their ex-
perience and their observations of the functioning and the operation of 
the Sajhas. 
below. 
Their subjective oplnlons and suggestions are analysed 
7.1.1 Attitudes of the Member Farmers Towards the Sajhas 
Most of the members (53 %) in the sample Sajha Societies had been 
members of the cooperative prior to the Sajha Program and 47% of members 
had joined after the introduction of the Sajha (Figure 7.1A). 
When asked if there had been any improvement in the functioning 
of the cooperative with the introduction of the Sajha Program, 44 % of the 
respondents reported that the Sajha Program had improved the functioning 
of the society , while the majority of them (56%) reported that there had 
not been any difference in the operational functioning of the society with 
the introduction of the Sajha Program (Figure 7 . 1B). 
FIGURE 7.1 (Diagramatic Presentation) 
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The majority of the members (80 %) are in support of the 
development of the Sajha through their moral support and active par-
ticipation by r epaying and borrowing through the Sajha on time. 
Most of the members of the Sajha (64%) borrowed more from the 
Sajha with the introduction of the Sajha Program while 36% of the 
members did not borrow more with the introduction of the Sajha Program 
(F i g ur e 7. Ie) . 
It has been the general feeling of most of the members that 
institutional credit is very difficult to obtain. Among the borrowing 
members 86% reported that it lS a cumbersome procedure to get loans from 
the Sajha, the rest (14 %) felt that it is easy to get loans from the 
Sajha if they are willing to adopt improved farming (Figure 7 .ID). 
The suggestions given by the interviewed members for making the 
Sajha a viable institution are mUltiple. The majority of them (56%) 
suggest that the loan collection be made in kind which would encourage 
them to repay on time at a better price through the institution. Forty-
seven per cent of the members suggested that the Sajha should distribute 
investment loans besides current production , covering pumpsets, con-
struction of small canals and darns for irrigation, livestock, poultry , 
pisciculture and cottage industry loans which would increase the volume 
of business of the Sajha by offering a wide range of credit services to 
the members through the village institution so that the Sajha becomes a 
viable institution in the long run. Forty-two per cent of the reporting 
members suggested that the Sajha should conduct a marketing and pledging 
of members ' agricultural produce so that they can get a better price after 
the peak season . Each society should have a warehouse to store the 
11 0 
pledged produce at the harvesting season so they can sellout their 
produce through the Sajha at a better prlce when the price goes up. The 
Sajha can collect serVlce and storage charges from the members from the 
pledging (Figure 7 . 1.E) . 
Management of the Sajha in the present set-up has not been 
favoured by the members because the system is based on automatic selection 
from the local Panchayat administration to the advisory board. Twenty-
five per cent of the members are against the system and suggest that an 
election system for the Board from among the members be introduced and 
would induce better management. The recovery of default loans can be 
made in time by introducing quick legal action and introducing penalty 
interest rates against those who are reluctant to repay back the Sajha 
loan on time . Twenty-two per cent of the reporting members are in favour 
of legal action and penalty interest rates. Some of the members complain 
that inputs and loans are not available in time. Twenty-three per cent 
suggest that continuous education and publicity is necessary to lmprove 
the functioning of the Sajha through mass meetings and conducting 
periodical seminars. 
7.2 Attitudes of Non-Borrowers Towards the Sajhas 
All the farmers in the area of the sample society have known of 
the existence of the Sajha . Forty-seven per cent consider that the Sajha 
is functioning well for the benefit of the farmers in the area, 41% ob-
served that there was no difference between the functioning of the Sajhas 
compared to the old cooperative system . The remaining 12% observed that 
the functioning of the Sajha has been deteriorating. They are not 
operating well for the benefit of the needy farmers (Figure 7.2A). 
FIGURE 7.2 
ATTITUDES OF NON - BORROWERS TOWARDS THE SAJHA 
N = 29 
47% Sajha is better than the cooperative 
41% No difference 
12% Sajha is not as good as the cooperative 
(A) 
47% 
• 12 % ' 
iI' • • • • 
...................... 
............. . ...... . 
.............. ....... . 
.............. . ..... . 
.............. ...... . 
.............. ... ... . 
.............. ...... . 
.. . ... .. .... . . .. ... . . 
.............. ...... . 
.............. ...... . 
. ... ... ....... ...... . 
...... .. ...... ..... . 
......... ..... ...... . 
.............. . .... . 
. .. ........... .. ... . 
.............. ..... . 
. .......... .. . . .... . 
.............. ... . . 
....... . 
~«<: ~: .. ~.~~. »»~: ~<:::: 
............... ........ . ... 
....... .......... .. ..... .. 
.... .......... ...... .... ...... ...... ............ ',' 
:-:-:-:.:-:-:- :«-:-:-:-:-:.:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: .. 
69 . 4% Sajha should conduct marketing and pledging 
31 . 6% Other measures 
(B) 
69 . 4% 
III 
Giving their specific reasons for not borrowing from the Sajha, 
55% reported that they did not need credit from the Sajha institution, 
they thought that if the institutional credit was not paid back In time 
that they would lose their property by auction. Other farmers In the 
area report that the Sajha was not organized in preVlOUS years but that 
they would be willing to borrow in years to corne . 
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Some of the farmers reported that they need investment loans 
but there is no provision for such loans through the Sajha and they have 
borrowed from the Agricultural Development Bank . Other farmers reported 
that it is a cumbersome process to get institutional loans. Some of 
them said that they had applied for loans but could not get it in time. 
Some of the farmers observed that the input prlces are high and they have 
to offer tangible assets for security which they don't want to offer. 
Several suggestions were offered to make the Sajha broad and 
serVlce oriented to the farmers; 69 . 4 % suggested that the Sajha should 
conduct marketing and pledging of agricultural produce of the farmers in 
the area and loan collection be made in kind . The rest (31.6%) of the 
non-borrowers suggested that publicity , continuous education, training 
for staff and technical supervision on modern technology should be made. 
The Sajha should provide loan for consumption purposes so that the farmers 
could be set free from the clutches of the private money lenders , to whom 
they pay higher rates of interest and lose their property (7 . 2B). 
7.3 Managerial Experience and the Sajha Program 
The performance of the Sajha Society has also been examined In 
the light of the experience of the Sajha managers . 
The majority of the Sajha managers (75%) had been working prior 
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to the Sajha Program (7.3 A) as cooperative managers appointed by the 
Agricultural Development Bank and the land reform department . But most 
of them (79 %) had experience of one to two years , 12.5 % had up to four 
years and only 8 .5 % had experience of more than five years (Figure 7. 3B) . 
The analysis shows that most of the Sajha managers do not have experience 
In the managerial field and have b een recruited only in recent years. 
Their observation of the difference in the functions of the co-
operative and the Sajha Program are as follows : 58.4 % reported that In 
their experlence there has been a change in the share capital through the 
transfer of compulsory savings into share capital, an increase in mernber-
ship, a reduction in area coverage and an lncrease In household coverage 
and l endings (Figure 7.3C). Over 40 % of the reporting managers reported 
that there has not been any change in the function of t he cooperative since 
the Sajha Program. 
When asked about the maln function of the Sajha, 55.5% of the 
managers are operating lending of production loans, purchase of draft 
animals and sales of agricultural inputs in cash, while the other 44.5 % 
are operating lending of production loans , purchase of draft animals 
(bullocks) , sales of agricultural inp uts, marketing of agricultural 
~. 
produce to some extent and supply of consumer goods to the farmers in the 
area (Figure 7.3D). 
The majority of Sajha managers (87.5 %) feel t ha t these functions 
are not adequate for the society, the Sajha has to run othe r programs 
such as lending of investment purpose loan, marketing and p l edging of 
agricultural produce, financing of the consumption loans to the needy 
farmers, etc . (Figure 7 . 3£). Because of the lack of proper suppliers, 
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FIGURE 7 . 3 
EXPERIENCE OF SAJHA MANAGERS AND THE SAJHA 
N = 24 
75 % Appointed before Sajha 
25% Appointed after Sajha 
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difficulties in supervision and technical guidance may arise when financing 
investment purposes ; there is room for misutilization by the borrowers 
due to their cash involvement . In financing investment loans, amend-
ments should be made to the Cooperative Act to provide for financing 
medium and long-term loan, if necessary under the guidance of the 
Agricultural Development Bank . 
The present lending procedures are lengthy and cumbersome, 
therefore the farmers are reluctant to borrow from the Sajha. There 
should be easy terms and conditions for borrowing and lending procedures. 
Repayment and collection of loan should be made in kind and the provision 
of consumption loans and warehouse facilities in each society could in-
crease the financial transaction of the society (Figure 7.4A and B). 
Most of the Sajhas in the sample are poorly staffed (58.5%) and 
they need clerks as well as technical supervisors (Figure 7.4C and D) for 
official work , follow-up , collection and supervision of loan and guidance 
and technical advice about modern methods of cUltivation in order to offer 
adequate services to the member farmers. 
All the societies face the problem of loan collection , lnex-
perienced staff, storage and public support . Cooperative law empowers 
them to take legal action through the cooperative department against de-
faulters to recover the due loans. But to exercise this power lS a maJor 
problem because of the lengthy and involved legal procedures . 
If legal power were entrusted to the Sajha against default loans 
with marketing and pledging and the collection of loans in kind from the 
farmers with godown facilities, it would certainly improve the functioning 
of the Sajha Societies. 
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FIGURE 7.4 
EXPERIENCE OF THE SAJHA MANAGERS AND THE SAJHA 
N = 24 
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17 . 5% Consumption loan 
(B) 
82.5% 
(D) 
50% eed clerk level 
50% Need technical staff 
7 . 4 Summar y 
These oplnlons from different personnel reveal that the 
operations of the Sajha at present are not sufficient to meet the needs 
of the rural people . The Sajha has to operate a wider variety of 
functions covering the lending of production as well as consumption 
loans, investment loans for irrigation, livestock and cottage industry, 
with marketing and storage facilities. 
The delinquency problem can be overcome by proper supervlslon, 
guidance and follow-up of loans with the provision of loan collection 
in kind from the members. The staff at present are inexperienced which 
could be improved through seminars, training and incentives. 
Some relaxation of the terms and conditions of lending should 
be made particularly to the small farmers, for instance financing of 
personal security and production potential of the farmers. 
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8 .1 The Sajha Program 
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The cooperative movement in Nepal started in 1953 as a government 
support program . The first Agricultural Cooperative Society was 
organized in the Rapti valley in 1956 with an executive order issued by 
His Majesty's Government (HMG) to provide credit and the supply of inputs 
to the settlers in order to reclaim the forest area for cUltivation. The 
first Cooperative Society Act was enacted in 1959, in which the powers of 
organization, registration and liquidation are entrusted to the Registrar 
by law. 
Nepalese agriculture lS considered predominantly a traditional 
subsistence sector consisting of small and fragmented holdings with a low 
level of productivity . The main source of credit to these subsistence 
farmers is still non-institutional sources. The formal lending institutions 
have come into operation very recently and the majority of the rural masses 
might not have known its prime importance . Cooperation in the form of 
mutual help like Parma and Manka-Guthi (group farming), Dharam Bhakari 
(Grain Bank) and Dhikuri (a cash bank) have been operating in a traditional 
way for a long time but their socio-economic impact and further improvements 
have not been studied yet. 
The objectives of the agricultural cooperative system in Nepal 
are two fold : firstly to enable the member farmers to have access to 
credit , goods and inputs to enhance their productive capacity and improve 
their level of living and secondly to develop self reliance for both 
individuals and the cooperatives to advance by government support. 
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Nepal has launched five 'Five Year Plans' but the achievements 
in the cooperative sector during the first three plans were negligible 
due to over ambitious targets for these plans . The Panchayat system of 
government was introduced in 1962 and the cooperatives were linked with 
this . A land reform program was introduced in 1963 and a system of com-
pulsory savings was initiated to accumulate capital for agricultural 
financing through rural savings by the institutions. A Cooperative Bank 
was established in 1963 as an institution for cooperative credit. 
The idea of supervised cooperat ive credit was introduced In 1968, 
after the conversion of the Cooperative Bank into the Agricultural 
Development Bank in 1967 . His Majesty ' s Government approved the super-
vised credit program at the beginning of the Fourth Plan in 1971; the 
management aspects were entrusted to the Agricultural Development Bank, 
Nepal (ADB/N) and the power of Registrar was transferred (management 
powers only) to the ADB to make the cooperative efficiently operative and 
responsive to the needs of the rural people. 
The target of re-organization or setting up of supervised co-
operatives was fixed at 251, to be organized over a phase of four years. 
The initial costs of cooperatives were subsidized by HMG as 100%, 75 %, 50% 
and 25 % for the succeeding years . At the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan 
the number of supervised cooperatives operating in different parts of the 
country was 289. 
The achievements during this period were encouraging In the sense 
that most of them were operating at break- even point. The supervised 
1 20 
cooperative program was implemented in 28 selected districts where 
transportation and irrigation facilities were abundant and the districts 
where the Intensive Agricultural Development Program had been launched. 
The extension service, cooperative credit and input supplies were linked 
together . The District Coordination Committee was formed to look after 
the implementation of the Program and it has been receiving broad policy 
guidelines from the central government . These committees prepare the 
Agricultural Development Program in the district and establish coordination 
among the various departments and agencies involved in agricultural 
development in the district; make arrangements for credit, input supplies 
and form an implementation team to help the farmers at the villages. 
The Sajha Program on which this study concentrates was intro-
duced in 1976, at the beginning of the Fifth Plan as a part of the Rural 
Development Program to provide access to credit, inputs, marketing outlays 
and banking facilities In the rural areas for the benefit of small farmers. 
The compulsory savings so far collected during the Land Reform Program 
were transferred into the share capital of the Sajhas. The Sajha 
Societies provide credit to those farmers who are willing to adopt lm-
proved methods of cultivation . Small farmers have to depend on borrowed 
funds from the institutions for purchase of new inputs. The input supply 
institutions are the Agricultural Input Corporation (monopolized government 
agency) for imports and distribution at the apex and the District Co-
operative Unions and the Sajhas at the village. 
8 . 2 Performance of the Sajha Program 
The main objective of this study was to evaluate the performance 
of the Sajha Program. The study has devised a number of performance 
indicators and these ind i cators are t e sted according to the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 1 . 
1 21 
A sample of 30 Sajha Societies selected by a stratified random 
sampling method, covering all districts of the Sajha area have been used 
in this study . The study is based on a comparison of two periods, before 
and after the Sajha Program . Activity comparlsons are made of the Sajhas 
In different reglons (Hills/Plains ) for both the periods in performing 
varlous credit functions . Efficiency indicators like membership , area 
and household coverage, share capital , lendings, repayment, overdues and 
the distribution of loans among various sizes of holding, financial profits 
and the annual financial turnover have been proposed for evaluation 
purposes . Non-parametric and parametric techniques have been used to 
analyse the performance . The sign test was conducted to determine 
whether or not a change has occurred with the introduction of the Sajha 
Program . The magnitude and the significance of the change have been 
carried out by conducting a paired t - test and the analysis of variance 
with the group mean as the basis of comparisons. The Chi -square test 
has been used to determine the differences among the groups most bene-
fitted b y Sajha credit ; the coefficients of variation and statistical 
averages are compared to study the differences among groups . 
To examine the operational procedures and the functioning of the 
Sajha and its social and economic impact , member farmers, non-borrowe rs 
and Sajha managers were asked a series of questions during data coll e ction 
and their Vlews on the Sajhas were analysed . 
8 . 3 St a tistical Results 
Although it lS too early to evaluate the Sajha Program compre-
hensively after only two years of ope ration , the major statistica l finding s 
o f comparl son s with t he p r e -Sajha period a r e a s f o llo ws: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Area Coverage . The area coverage with the 
introduction of the Sajha has been reduced 
from an average of 4 . 8 to 2.48 Panchayats. 
The household coverage has increased with 
an average of 696 households since the 
introduction of the Sajha Program. 
Membership. Membership prior to the Sajha 
Program was voluntary but membership now is 
obligatory due to the transfer of compulsory 
savings into share capital . The introduction 
of the Sajha Program has increased membership 
with an average of 519 members/nearly twice 
as large as the pre-Sajha situation. 
Regional variability exists in membership, 
the Plains having a higher membership. 
Share Capital . The transfer of compulsory 
savings into share capital has drastically 
increased the amount of share capital with an 
average of Rs 132,464, nearly double the pre-
Sajha situation. The share capital per member 
is Rs 255 which is nearly five times greater 
than that of pre - Sajha . 
Lending and Delinquency. Lending has increased 
with an average of Rs 201,380 per society but the 
loan per member has d e creased slightly because 
of an increase in membership. Delinquency has 
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e . 
f. 
also increased proportionately with an average of 
Rs 72,505 per society but the delinquency per 
member has decreased in t he po s t-Sa jha period. 
Financial Turnover. The financial turnover has 
increased with an average per society being 
Rs 446,000 nearly twice that of pre-Sajha. 
Profit and Loss. The cooperatives on average 
recorded losses of Rs 1,500 , but with the intro-
duction of the Sajha Program the Sajhas are 
recording an average profit of Rs 5 , 400, although 
some of them are still running at a loss. 
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The first two hypotheses that ' the introduction of the supervised 
Sajha Program has improved the credit function of the Sajha Societies ' and 
that ' the improved functioning has led to greater use of credit, profita-
bility and the financial turnover of the Society ' have been confirmed 
by the sign test indicating that there has been an improvement in the 
credit function of the society with the introduction of the Sajha Program. 
The magnitude of the change has been measured and there has been 
a decrease In the area coverage meaning thereby that the Sajhas are con-
centrating on a smaller area but with greater efficiency and an lncrease 
in membership , share capital and current lendings in the post- Sajha period. 
There are also changes in profits, overdue position and financial turnover 
but they are not significant. 
The third hypothesis that 'the Sajhas in different regions with 
different lines of activities differ In their efficiency ' has been tested 
by using the analys i s of varlance . The results obtained show that the 
Sajhas located in the Plains differ significantly from those of the Hills 
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In share capital , lending and area coverage due to an uneven rate of 
growth , and large and uneconomlC infrastructure . But the Sajhas in 
the Hills are equally as efficient as those of the Plains In membership, 
profit making , financial turnover , and repayments , and in conducting all 
their business operations . 
The fourth and the fifth hypotheses that ' larger farmers dominate 
the Advisory Committee ' and that ' default rates are higher for those 
dominant groups ' have been tested by using the Chi - square test. The 
results reveal that the l arge farmers dominate the Advisory Committee 
and their default rates are higher . They have also borrowed a greater 
amount of l oan from the Sajha and are more re l uctant to repay it in due 
t i me . 
Average borrowing per member per Bigha increases with an increase 
In Slze of farm holding . The variation is higher among the larger sizes 
of farm holding indicating that the larger farmers have borrowed more 
from the Sajha than the smal l farmers . 
The average per Bi gha needs of credit are found to decrease with 
an increase of farm size in both the reglons . The smaller size of farm 
holding needs more credit than the larger s i ze because larger size farms 
can generate sufficient funds for future investment. 
The average distribution of loan per unit area increases with 
the decrease of farm size. This lS true in both the regions . The 
average repayment per member also increases as the size of farm holding 
lncreases . The proportion of repayments from current production is higher 
than the investment loan for all sizes of farm holding In both the regions. 
The repayment records are better In the Hills than In the Plains. 
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The delinquency rates per society are higher among the larger 
Slze of farm holding in both the regions indicating that as the size of 
farm increases the delinquency lncreases and this is higher In the Plains 
than In the Hills. 
The majority of members had joined the society prlor to the Sajha 
Program and generally observed that the Sajha Program is no different 
from the cooperative system in its functions. All the members are 
interested in the Sajha Program but the procedure of getting a loan is 
cumbersome and could be improved in the following ways: (i) by providing 
investment loans through the Sajha; (ii) by collecting loans In kind and 
introducing marketing of members' agricultural produce through the Sajha; 
(iii) by constructing a warehouse in each society; (iv) by electing a 
management board of members for better management; and (v) by educating 
continuously through conducting seminars and training staff and members. 
All the farmers in the rural areas know about the Sajhas but 
they are unaware of their importance. Mos t of the non-borrowers are 
reluctant to take loans from the Sajha because the procedures are long and 
cumbersome with the completion of many formalities . This could be 
remedied by making easier terms and conditions which would be more attrac-
tive to the rural masses such as providing agricultural technicians In 
each society and collecting loans In kind and providing consumption loans 
to the needy farmers. 
Members suggested in the interviews that legal action against 
the default loans should be taken quickly through the Sajhas and penalty 
interest rates could be imposed. 
The majority of the Sajha managers are inexperienced and have 
only been appointed for between one and two years. Most of the Sajhas 
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are lending only production loans and for the purchase of bullocks; these 
functions are not adequate for a viable society . A wide range of 
agricultural lending should be conducted through the Sajha to make them 
viable in the long run . According to the cooperative managers inter-
viewed the Sajhas are poorly staffed with very few incentives; they 
need clerks and technicians for proper record keeping and proper super-
vision, follow up and loan collection . All the Sajhas are facing 
problems of loan collection , storage difficulties which .could be improved 
through collection in kind, godown construction and training for the 
staff . 
Relaxation in the terms and conditions of loan should be made, 
particularly to small farmers, distributing loans on productive capacity 
with personal guarantees . 
8 . 4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Most of the small farmers have not received Sajha credit due to 
lack of collateral , complicated and cumbersome procedures and formality 
requirements. A larger proportion of the Sajha credit has gone to the 
larger farmers. If the small farmers are the target groups of the program 
then a proportionate percentage of loans should be allocated to the small 
farmers for current production as well as investment purposes. The terms 
and conditions of the loan should be relaxed making it within easy reach 
of the small farmers. 
To mobilize and encourage rural savings, higher interest rates 
should be glven In time savlng , providing a banking facility In each Sajha 
Society . 
Timely supply of agricultural inputs at a subsidy rate and the 
collection of loan In kind from the members with marketing, pledging and 
storage facilities through the Sajha could encourage the farmers to 
borrow and repay loans in time. Legal action against the default loans 
should be taken promptly and penal interest rates could be imposed. 
The Sajhas should be made free from political influence by con-
ducting a free election to make the Sajha more democratic and service 
oriented in the interests of the small farmers rather than keeping the 
Sajha linked to the Panchayat system. 
The Advisory Committee after election should be representative 
of each category of the farmer members, if the objective of the Sajha 
Program is to help the small farmers of the agricultural sector. 
It is generally assumed that cooperative education is needed for 
improving the performance in different lines of activity. Another way 
of improving the efficiency of the staff is to provide incentives to them 
In the form of higher salaries, bonuses, housing, higher training and 
security of job. 
Record keeping In most of the Sajhas has been found to be very 
poor; training for record keeping and other technical matters would 
enhance the efficiency of the Sajhas. 
Follow up and supervision of the loans and the Program as a whole 
should be conducted from the district (and from the centre periodically) 
but the problems arising during implementation of the Program should be 
solved immediately which could be done by entrusting certain levels of 
power to the staff engaged in the implementation at grass root level .. 
Coordination and responsibilities of the agencies involved in 
the Agricultural Development Program should be assigned strictly from the 
central leve l. 
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This thesis has evaluated the Sajha Program Slnc e its inceptio n 
In 1976, and has developed methods whic h can be used In further research 
or for continuing assessment . More extensive research on cooperative 
credit should be carried out every year to see if the small farmers are 
benefitting from the supervised Sajha Program in accordance with government 
and cooperative aims . 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
QUEST I ONNAIRE 
IDENTIFICATION CARD 
1. Zone ........................... 2 . District ..................... . 
3. Village Panchayat ................................................. . 
4. Name of the Cooperative Society .............. . ............. ....... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Registered No. and Date .......................... . .. .......... . ... . 
6. Name of the Manager 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . 
7 . Total Employees No. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
8 . Panchayat coverage by cooperative s: 
( i) 
( ii) 
Before 
After 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
9. Total Household No.: 
( i) 
(ii) 
Before 
After 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
10. Total member of Sajha Society: 
( i) 
(ii) 
Before 
After 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
11. Interviewed by: ................................. ...... .. ... ... ... . . 
Date: ....................... ........ .. . 
12. Checked by: .................................. ..................... . 
Da te : ................. ...... . . ........ . 
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Period 
Before Sajha 
Programme 
After Sajha 
Programme 
Schedule - 1 
Growth of Membership According to Holding Size 
(Before and After Sajha Programmes) 
Less than 1-2 Bigha 4-10 Bigha 2-4 Bigha 
Landless 1 Bigha or or 5-10 10-20 Ropani 10 20
0r 
. 5 Ropani Ropani - Ropanl 
(No . ) (No . ) (No . ) (No. ) (No. ) 
Note : Check Ropani for the Hill and Bigha for the Terai. 
10 Bigha & 
above more 
than 50 
Ropani 
Total Remark 
I-' 
W 
o 
Schedule - 2 
Financial Positions 
Particular 
(1 ) 
1 . Financial Resources: 
a ) Paid-up share capital 
b) Reserved Fund 
c) Other Fund 
Total: 
2 . Loan Outstanding: 
a) Non-delinquent 
b) Delinquent 
c) Doubtful 
Total: 
3. Loan to be paid to: 
a) Agricultural Dev . Bank 
b) Others 
Total: 
4 . Fixed Assets : 
a) Building 
b) Land 
c) Godown 
d) Others 
Total : 
5 . Stocks: 
a) Agricultural Inputs 
b) Agricultural Products 
c) Consumer goods 
Total: 
6. Investment: 
a) Purchase of shares 
b) Investment on Bonds 
c) Others . . . . . . . 
Total: 
Before 
Sajha 
Programme 
(2) 
One Year 
After Sajha 
Programme 
(3 ) 
(In Rs.) 
2 Years 
After Sajha 
Programme 
(4 ) 
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Remark 
(5) 
(1 ) 
7. Cash Balance 
8 . Income: 
a) Contribution from 
ADB/N 
b) Interest from Loan 
c ) Corrunission 
d) Others ...... . 
Total: 
9 . Administrative Expenses : 
a) Salary and Allowance 
b) Interest paid on 
loan and deposit 
c) Rent 
d) Others 
Total: 
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Contd . Schedule - 2 
(2) (3) (4 ) (5 ) 
1 . Cereal Crops 
(a) Paddy 
(b) Wheat 
(c) Maize 
( d) · . . . . 
(e) · . . . . 
(f) · . . . . 
2 . Cash Crops 
(a) Jute 
(b) Tobacco 
(c) Sugar Cane 
(d) Oil seeds 
3 . Others 
(a) · . . . . . . . 
(b) · . . . . . . . 
(c) · . . . ~ . . . 
Total: 
Landless 
B. S . A. S . 
Schedule - 3 
Lending Operations by Size of Holdings 
(Disbursement , Repayment and Overdue Position) 
Less than 1 1 - 2 Bigha or 2 - 4 Bigha 4 - 10 Bigha 
Bigha or 5 5 - 10 Ropani 10- 20 Ropani 20 - 50 Ropani 
Ropani 
B . S . A. S . B. S . A . S . B . S . A. S . B . S . A . S . 
10 Bigha and 
above or more Total 
than 50 Ropani 
B. S . A. S . B . S . A. S . 
No Amt No Amt No Arnt No Amt No Arnt No Arnt No Arnt No Amt No Arnt No Amt No Arnt No Amt No Arnt No Arnt 
Remark 
I-' 
W 
W 
,. 
1 . 
2 . 
3. 
Schedule - 3 
Lending Operations by Size of Holdings 
(Disbursement, Repayment and Overdue Position) 
Less than 1 1 2 . h 2 4 . h 4 10 . h 10 Bigha and 
- Blg a or - Blg a - Blg a 
Landless Bigha or 5 10 . 10 20 . 20 cO . above or more Total 
. - Ropanl - Ropanl - J Ropanl . Purpose 5 Ropanl than 50 Ropanl Remark 
B. S . A. S . B. S . A. S . B. S . A. S . B. S . A.S. B . S . A. S . B. S . A. S. B. S . A. S . 
No Amt No Amt No Amt No Amt No Amt No Amt No Amt No Amt No Amt No Arnt No Amt No Amt No Amt No Arnt 
Cereal Crops 
a) Paddy 
b) Wheat 
c ) Maize 
d) · . . . .... 
e ) · . . . . . .. 
f) · . . . . . . . 
Cash Crops 
a) Jute 
b) Tobacco 
c) Sugarcane 
d) Oilseeds 
Others 
a) · . . . . . . . 
b) · . . . . . . . 
c) · . . . . . .. 
Total: 
i-' 
W 
~ 
~ 
L~~ 2-~~:~~~~~~-:~..;a-~~~~~~::-~;5~~~~~~~:':?:~t'~~t~~~t;r~;~~fft~·!~!~~i '='~~.aa"'\'II.au~ ....... a~v"'~~."-'-'''L.~a''''~~'1.".,,''' ...... .eNl!._''' •• . 0;: 
Particular 
1 . Fertilizers : 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
2 . Improved Seeds: 
(a) Paddy 
(b) Wheat 
(c) Maize 
(d) ...... . .. . 
( e ) ......... . 
3. Local Seeds: 
(a) Paddy 
(b) Wheat 
(c) Maize 
4 . Pesticides : 
(a) .••... . ... 
(b) .....•..• . 
( c ) ...... . .. . 
5 . Agriculture Implements: 
( a ) .... . .... . 
(b) .... .. . . . . 
(c) 
6 . Others , if any: 
(a) .. .. . . •. •. 
(b) . . .•. . .... 
(c) 
Note : Q = Quarter 
U = Unit 
A = Amount 
Schedule - 4 
Cash Sales of Agricultural Inputs , Implements and Others 
One Year Before Sajha First Year After Sajha Second Year After Sajha 
1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q Total 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q Total 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q Total 
U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A U A 
Remark 
f--' 
W 
lJl 
Particular 
1 . Cereal Crops : 
(a) Paddy 
(b) Wheat 
(c) Maize 
( d) · . . . . . ... 
(e) · . . . . . ... 
2 . Cash Crops: 
(a) Sugar Cane 
(b) Oilseeds 
(c) Jute 
(d) Tobacco 
(e) · . . . . . . . . 
(f) · . . . . . . . . 
Schedule - 5 
Marketing of Agricultural Produce 
One Year Before Sajha First Year After Sajha Second Year After Sajha 
Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale 
Qty . Amount Qty . Amount Qty. Amount Qty . Amount Qty . Amount Qty . Amount 
Remarks 
\-' 
W 
()\ 
,--
a . 
b . 
c . 
d . 
e . 
f . 
Particular 
Salt 
Kerosene 
Sugar 
Medicines 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Others : 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(i v) 
(v) 
(vi) 
Total: 
Schedule - 6 
Purchase and Sales of Consumer Goods 
One Year Before Sajha F i rst Year After Sajha Second Year After Sajha 
Purchase Sales Purchase Sales Purchase Sales 
Qty . Amo~nt Qty . Amount Qty . Amount Qty . Amount Qty . Amount Qty . Amount 
Remarks 
i---' 
w 
-.....J 
1 
Questionnaire - 1 
(To be asked from member farmer) 
1. When you joined the Cooperative Society .... ... . Month ... ... .. Year. 
2 . Were you previously the member of the Coop . Society? Yes No 
3. If Yes, what difference you found in the operation of Cooperative 
Society and Sajha Society? 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
4. Since the Cooperative Society has been renamed as Sajha Society 
with added responsibilities under Sajha Program, how do you feel 
your responsibility towards the development of Sajha Society? 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Did you borrow money from Sajha Society this year? Yes No 
6. If Yes, did you find cumbersome procedure in getting the loan. 
Give your comment. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
7. What suggestions could you like to offer to make this Sajha Society 
a viable institution? 
Suggestions : 
(a) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
· . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(b) · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 
(c) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Questionnaire - 2 
(To be asked with non borrowers ) 
1. Are you fami liar with the functioning of Sajha Cooperatives? 
Yes No 
2 . If Yes , what is your observations towards the functioning of Sajha 
Cooperatives? 
(a) · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(b) · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(c) · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3 . Why didn 't you borrow from the Sajha Society? 
r eason s? 
Are there specific 
(a) · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(b) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(c) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. As a non borrower , what is your suggestions to make the Sajha 
Society really broad and service ori ented to the farmers? 
(a) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
(b) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(c ) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Questionnaire - 3 
(To be asked with Board Member) 
1. When you joined the Sajha Cooperative Society as a member of the 
Board? Date: 
, 
2. Where you previously the member of Cooperatives? Yes No 
J 
3 . If Yes , what difference you have observed in the functioning of 
Sajha Cooperatives and Previous Cooperatives? 
(a) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. 
(b) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(c) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(d) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
4. As a member of the Board what problernsyou have faced in taking 
decisions with regard to the policy matters of the cooperative? 
Problems : 
(a) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(b) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(c) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(d) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ............. .. .. 
5. What suggestions would you like to regard to the improvement in the 
functions of the cooperatives in general and the effectiveness of 
the Board of Sajha Society in particular. 
(a) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(b) 
.. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(c ) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(d) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
(e) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(f) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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6 . What i s your size of operational holdings and how much loan you 
have taken from the cooperat ives and for what purpose? 
(a) Size of holdings 
(b) Total loan taken from the cooperatives . Rs ..... . 
(c) Purpose of loan 
(d) Loan paid . Rs .............. . ............ ...... . 
(e ) Delinquent . Rs .......................... .. .... . 
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7. What do you suggest to curb the delinquent loans of the cooperatives 
and increase the flow of credit through it? 
(a) 
(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Questionnaire - 4 
Name of the Manager ......... . 
1. Are you working In this society Slnce the establishment of the 
Sajha Society? Yes No 
2 . Were you the manager of cooperatives prlor to launching the 
Sajha Program? Yes No 
3. If Yes, what difference you see In the functions of cooperatives 
and the Sajha Society? 
(a) 
(b) 
(c ) 
4. What are the basic functions carried out by the Sajha Society 
Slnce its establishment? 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
5. Do you think that these functions are adequate to run Sajha as a 
viable institution? Yes No 
6 . If No, what other functions are necessary that the Sajha should 
carry out? 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
7. In your opinion, what are the factors responsible that the Sajha 
have not been able to finance for medium term loan? 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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APPEND I X 2 
COUPON 
Agricultural Development Bank 
(Established under ADB Act 2024) 
Regd . No: ........ . 
... . .. . ...... Office 
Despatch No : .... . .... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Date: .......... . .. . 
Sir , 
As Mr . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • •• 0 f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... has been 
(Name : person/institution ) (place) 
granted a credit of Rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . from ADB , we hereby request you to 
(Amount) 
supply following goods of value not exceeding Rs 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
the i nstitution or individual ) 
Sl . No . Particulars 
(Amount ) 
Quantity Price Total 
Value 
to 
(Name of 
Remarks 
ADB agrees to pay equivalent amount for the supply of above goods on 
presentation of the bills and concerned documents by the supplier. The 
bills , however , should be accompanied by receipts properly signed by the 
borrower or his representative, whose signature is given below. 
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It is important to note that goods mentioned above should be supplied 
within . . ..... days of the issue of this coupon, otherwise no claims will 
b e entertained. 
1. Supplier Specimen Signature Sincerely Yours, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Branch/Sub-Branc h Manager 
Copy : 
2 . Borrowe r (Requested to approach the supplier ) 
3 . 
/i 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX 4 
DEFINITION OF THE TERMS 
Bigha: A Bigha is a local unit of land measurement In the Plain area of 
Nepal, and equals .67 hectares . 
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Cost of Production: Total of all inputs used multiplied by their respective 
existing prices including depreciation and interest. 
Credit: Borrowing from any source . 
Delinquent Loan : When the borrower fails to pay back the full or partial 
amount of loan to the institutions from which he has borrowed 
within a committed time. 
Gross Income : Product of output multiplied by its existing prlce. 
HYV : Crop varieties that have been evolved through breeding and screening 
processes and are believed to outproduce the traditional varieties. 
Institutional Credit: Borrowing from formal sources like the Agricultural 
Development Bank and the Sajhas. 
LTL: Long term loan supplied to the borrower for maJor land improvements, 
godown construction, mechanized farming and horticultural farming 
etc . ; its duration of maturity is five years to twenty years. 
Medium Term Loan: Loan supplied by the institutions for the purchase of 
livestock, implements, pumping sets etc.; its duration of maturity 
is from 18 months to five years. 
Non-institutional Credit: Borrowing from informal sources like private 
money lenders, relatives, land lords, merchants etc. 
Non-delinquent Loan: A loan which the borrower still has time to repay 
to the institution. 
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Panchayat: The basic local administrative unit under the present system 
of politics in Nepal. 
Ropani : A local unit of land measurement In the Hills of Nepal, equal to 
0 . 052 hectare. 
Rupees: Nepalese currency, $USl = NRs 12.5 
Sajha : The Nepalese word for cooperative . 
STL : Short term loan, also known as production loan; its duration of 
maturity does not exceed more than 18 months. 
Size of Holding: The classification of operational holding of farmers 
into large, medium and small size groups, worked out on the basis 
of listing the actual size of holding of all member farmers 
recorded in the Sajha during the survey for this study. 
147 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abraham, Sarojini 1973. 'Cooperative Credit for Small Farmers in India', 
AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, Vol . X, Feb. 1973. 
Adams , D. W. 1973. ' The Case for Voluntary Savings Mobilization. Why do 
Rural Credit Markets Flounder? ', AID Spring Review of Small 
Farmer Credit, 19 (119), June 1973. 
Agricultural Development Bank , Nepal 1968. 'Cooperative System in Nepal. 
A Critical Appraisal and Recommendation for the Future' , 
unpublished, The Cooperative Review Committee Report, Kathmandu 
1968. 
ADB/N 1973a. ' Area/Projec t Approach to Agricultural Finance Through 
Supervised Credit Program ', unpublished Report , Planning, Research 
and Project Division, Kathmandu 1973. 
ADB/N 1973b. ' Cooperative Manual: A Guide Line' , Cooperative 
Revitalization Section, Kathmandu, June 1973. 
ADB/N 1973c. 'Cooperative Revitalization Program', unpublished Report of 
Planning, Research and Project Division, Kathmandu 1973. 
ADB/N 1978. Loan Disbursement Manual, (Nepali) Loan Division, Kathmandu 
1978. 
Asian Development Bank 1967. Rural Asia, Challenge and Opportunity, 
Praegar Publishers USA 1967. 
Colyer , Dale and Guillerme, Jimenez 1971. 'Supervised Credit as a Tool 
In Agricultural Development', AJE, Vol. 53, No.4, Nov. 1971. 
Croxton , F . and Cowden, D. 1964. Applied General Statistics, 2nd edition, 
Prentice Hall of India Pty.Ltd., New Delhi, 1964. 
Dantwala, M. L. 1966. 'Institutional Credit in Subsistence Agriculture', 
International Journal of Agrarian Affairs, Vol . 5, Dec. 1966. 
Digby , Margaret 1949. The World Cooperative Movement, Hutchinson's 
University Library , London 1949, Ch.VI. 
Dulfer, Eberhard 1 974 . Operat ional Efficiency of Agricultural Co -
operatives in Developing Countries, FAO, Rome 1974. 
EAPD 1972. Development of Agricultural Extension Service in Nepal, HMG, 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture EAPD Staff Paper No.ll, 
Singhdurbar Kathmandu, Sept 1972. 
FAO 1966. New Approach to Agricultural Credit, Supervised Credit Combined 
with Cooperatives and Agricultural Extension, Agricultural 
Development Paper No.77, FAO of United Nations Rome, 1966. 
FAO 1974 . ' Perspective Study of Agricultural Development for Nepal ', 
unpublished Restricted Working Paper on Cooperatives, Human 
Resources , Institution and Agrarian Reform Division, FAO of 
United Nations , Rome , April 1974. 
148 
Firth , R. and B. S . Yamey 1964. Capital Savings and Credit In Peasant 
Societies , Chicago , Aldine 1964. 
Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio 1977. ' Interest Rate Restriction and Income 
Distribution ', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
Vol . 59 , No .5, Dec . 1977. 
Helm, F . C. 1968. The Economics of Cooperative Enterprises , University 
of London Press Ltd., 1968. 
His Majesty ' s Government of Nepal, (HMG/N ) 1 956 . First Plan, (Nepali), 
Ministry of Economic Planning , Kathmandu , 1 956. 
HMG/N 1964. Third Pl an , (Nepali), Ministry of Economic Planning , Kathmandu 
1964. 
HMG/N 1970. Fourth Plan , (Nepali ), National Planning Commission, Kathmandu 
1970 . 
HMG/N 1975. Fifth Plan, (Nepali ), National Planning Commission, Kathmandu 
1975. 
HMG/N 1974. Cooperative Law 1959 and its Amendments 1962, (Nepali), 
Ministry of Law and Justice, Kathmandu 1 974 . 
HMG/N 1976. Sajha Program for Rural Development (Nepali), Ministry of 
Food , Agriculture and Irrigation, Singhdurbar, Kathmandu 1976. 
HMG/N 1976 . ' Present position of Agricultural Cooperatives in Nepal 
With Special Reference to their Role in the Field of Agricultural 
Development', unpublished Seminar Paper of Lnd Reform, Dept. of 
Cooperatives , Kathmandu , 1976. 
HMG/N 1976. ' Promotion of Savings by Cooperatives ', unpublished Seminar 
Paper of Ministry of Land Reform, Dept . of Cooperatives , Kathmandu 
1976. 
HMG/N 1977. Agricultural Statistics of Nepal , Ministry of Food , 
Agriculture and Irrigation , Dept . of Food and Agricultural 
Marketing Services , Agricultural Statistics Division, Kathmandu 
1977 
HMG/N 1978 . ' Brief History of Cooperative Movement in Nepal', unpublished 
Seminar Paper of Min istry of Land Reform, Dept . of Cooperatives, 
Kathmandu 1978 . 
Holyoake , G. J. 1875. History of Cooperation, Vol . I, Trubner and Co., 
London 1875. 
L 
14 9 
Hough , E. M. 1966 . The Cooperative Movement In India, Oxford University 
Press , Calcutta-13 1966 . 
IBRD 1975 . World Bank, Agricultural Credit Sector Policy Paper, 
Washington D. C. May 1975. 
Long , M. F . 1968 . ' Why do Peasant Farmers Borrow?', American Economic Review, 
Vol . 50 , Nov . 1968. 
Nepal Rastra Bank 1972. Agricultural Credit Survey, Vol.1-4, Kathmandu, 
July 1972. 
Nepal Rastra Bank 1977. 'A Case Study on the Wholesale Marketing of 
Chemical Fertilizers in the Rupandeli District' , unpublished 
Seminar Paper , Kathmandu, June 19 77. 
Nie , Hull, Jenkin, Karin and Bent 1975. Statistical Package for Social 
Science , McGraw Hill, Sydney 1975. 
Prabasi , S . C. 1966. Nepalese Cooperative Development, HMG , Ministry of 
Land Reform , Department of Cooperatives, Kathmandu 1966. 
Rajkrishna 1979. ' A Framework of Rura l Credit Policy for Small Farmers 
of Asia' , Seminar Paper delivered at the Second General Assembly 
of Asian and Pacifi c Regional Agricultural Credit Association, 
at Karanchi (Pakistan) on Feb . 5, 1979. 
RBI 1969. Report of the Al l India Rural Credit Review Committee, Reserve 
Bank of India , Bombay 1969. 
Sidney Siegel 1956 . Statistics for the Behavioural Science, International 
Student Edition , McGraw Hill, Tokyo 1956. 
Singh , Mohinder 1970. Cooperatives in Asia, Praeger Publisher Inc ., 
New York , 1 970 . 
Sinha , B. K. 1964. Cooperative Development In Nepal, Kitab Mahal , Pty.Ltd., 
Allahbad 1964. 
Sinha , B. K. 1969. Cooperatives in India, Committee for Cooperative 
Training (National Cooperative Union of India) New Delhi , 1969. 
Surridge, B. J . and Margaret Digby 1967. A Manual of Cooperative Law and 
Practice, Third Edition Cambridge , W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., 
London 1967. 
Tyagi, R . B. 1968 . Recent Trends in the Cooperative Movement In India, 
Asia Publ ishing House , Bornbay-l, 1968. 
USAID 1974 . The Cooperative System and Rural Credit In Sri Lanka, Marga 
Publication Research Studies-3, Colornbo- 12, 1974 . 
Whitaker, M. D. 1 973 . ' Supervised Credit ; its Impact on Profits , Production 
Factor Use , Technical Change and Efficiency of Resource Allocation 
In Corn Production in Colombian Agriculture ', AID Spring Review 
of Small Farmer Credit , Vol . lXX, 1973 . 
